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It is estimated that egg and sperm donations account for more than 
60,000 births every year in the United States.  However, surprisingly, and 
despite common misconceptions, there are no federal requirements and 
barely any state requirements to screen and test sperm and egg donors for 
genetic diseases.  The only nationwide standards for genetic screening and 
testing of donated reproductive tissue are guidelines created by 
professional organizations, but compliance with those guidelines is 
voluntary so they cannot be enforced effectively.  Furthermore, the few 
reported cases involving children born from genetically-compromised 
reproductive tissue illustrate the court system’s failure to afford such 
children and their families the relief they need and deserve.  With a 
continuing rise in the number of babies born each year who are conceived 
with donated reproductive tissue, it is necessary to create a regulatory 
framework requiring the screening and testing of reproductive tissue 
donors for genetic diseases.  This article makes the case for federal 
regulation of the genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue under the 
authority granted to the FDA by the Public Health Service Act. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine John and Jane, a couple with a common problem experienced by one in 
every six couples in the United States:2  infertility.3  John and Jane seek medical advice 
and discover that one of them is sterile. They decide to take advantage of one of the 
numerous assisted reproductive technologies (ART)4 now available to couples suffering 
from difficulties such as theirs and start looking for a suitable donor.  Browsing through 
online donor catalogues, they find a donor whose sperm or eggs they would like to use.  
The sperm/egg bank assures them that their chosen donor—a young, tall, good-looking, 
gifted, intelligent, and athletic graduate student—has undergone careful screening and 
was tested5 for health problems as required by all applicable federal and state laws.  
Having received such assurances, John and Jane attempt to conceive using the donated 
reproductive tissue (DRT)6 they have procured from the bank.  They are successful and 
soon thereafter Jane gives birth to twins, Jean and Juan.  Alas, after the birth, Jean is 
                                                
2 See S. Rep. No. 102-452, at 1 (1992); ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of 
Fertility Techniques, 281 Science 651, 651 (1998) [hereinafter ISLAT Working Group]. 
3 Infertility is commonly defined as the inability to get pregnant after trying for one year.  See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Assisted Reproductive Technology:  Home, 
http://www.cdc.gov/art (last visited May 9, 2010).  
4 According to the CDC, ART consists of all clinical treatments and laboratory procedures—
including the handling of human oocytes and sperm, or embryos—conducted with the intent of 
conceiving, e.g., in-vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian 
transfer, sperm, oocyte or embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy.  See Implementation of 
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992–A Model Program for the 
Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 64 Fed. Reg. 39374, 39383 (CDC July 21, 1999) 
[hereinafter CDC Model Program].  
5 For purposes of this article, “testing” is defined as any procedure involving direct clinical 
examination of a potential donor or her tissue, whereas “screening” is any inference of clinical 
information through indirect examination of a donor’s background.  For example, questioning a 
potential donor in order to identify possible genetic risk factors in her family’s medical history is 
a screening procedure, while verifying that her genes do not contain certain genetic mutations by 
attempting to identify certain genetic markers in a cell sample taken from her would be 
considered testing.  Notably, direct testing of the genes of a potential donor is not the only readily 
available method of testing donor candidates.  For example, ECG could assist in identifying heart 
conditions whose genetic background may be unclear or otherwise difficult to ascertain.  See 
Barry J. Maron et al., Implications of Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Transmitted by Sperm 
Donation, 302 JAMA 1681, 1684 (2009) (reporting that an electrocardiogram could assist in 
identifying 80-95% of the cases of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy in adults with left ventricular 
hypertrophy, a hereditary and potentially lethal cardiac anomaly).    
6 The term “donated reproductive tissue” includes all forms of reproductive cells that can be 
used in ART, namely sperm and ova (eggs) in different developmental stages and in different 
media.  
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diagnosed with cystic fibrosis (CF)7 and a few years later Juan is diagnosed as suffering 
from autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD).8  John and Jane are 
devastated.  Inquiries conducted by their (very expensive) attorneys reveal that their 
donor was a carrier of a CF mutation.  Moreover, after overcoming numerous legal 
hurdles, John and Jane find out that their donor’s aunt and grandmother died from kidney 
failure.  They sue the DRT bank for regular and punitive damages under numerous causes 
of action including negligence, products liability, wrongful life, infliction of emotional 
distress and fraud.  Yet, the court rejects the majority of their claims as a matter of law.  
Furthermore, the court is unsympathetic to the family’s situation and holds that children 
do not have the “right to be born free of diseases” regardless of whether they were 
conceived naturally or through ART.  The tissue bank issues a press release truthfully 
stating that it is meticulously following and is in full compliance with all federal and state 
legislation and regulation.  It quickly reaches a quiet and relatively cheap settlement with 
the Does regarding their remaining claims; if it is a member of a professional 
accreditation organization, such as the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB), it 
might lose its membership for a short while.   
This hypothetical scenario illustrates actual cases litigated in the United States9 
and foreshadows more that are likely to be brought under the current federal and state 
                                                
7 CF is a hereditary disease whose symptoms usually appear shortly after birth and include 
digestion problems, breathing difficulties and respiratory infections; in the past it was almost 
always fatal in childhood, but nowadays patients commonly live long past childhood.  CF is an 
autosomal recessive condition, meaning that in order to have an affected child both parents must 
carry the mutated gene and pass it along to the child, which has a one in four (1:4) likelihood of 
happening with each pregnancy.  See National Human Genome Research Institute, Glossary, 
http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih1/genetic/other/glossary/act1-gloss2.htm (last 
visited May 9, 2010); National Genome Research Institute, Learning about Cystic Fibrosis, 
http://www.genome.gov/10001213 (last visited May 9, 2010).  
8 According to the Human Genome Research Institute, ADPKD is one of the most common 
forms of polycystic kidney disease (PKD), a genetic disorder characterized by the growth of 
numerous cysts in both kidneys.  As the disease progresses, the cysts get filled with fluid and 
slowly replace much of the normal mass of the kidneys, thus reducing kidney function and 
leading to kidney failure.  PKD can also cause cysts in the liver and problems in other organs 
such as the pancreas, the heart and the brain, as well as high blood pressure (hypertension), 
abdominal wall hernias, and more.  As indicated by its name, ADPKD is an autosomal dominant 
disease, which means that if a child inherits one copy the ADPKD gene he or she will likely 
develop the disease. Each child of a parent having an ADPKD gene has a 50-50 chance of 
inheriting the ADPKD gene. See National Human Genome Research Institute, Learning About 
Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease, http://www.genome.gov/20019622 (last visited 
May 9, 2010).   
9 See Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that the kidney disease of a child born from DRT (DRT child) was caused by a gene in 
the sperm rather than by either the sperm bank or the bank’s physician’s actions in improperly 
approving the sperm donor, and thus, that the child could not recover general damages or lost 
earnings); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811-12 (N.Y. 1978) (rejecting “wrongful life” as 
a cognizable cause of action and holding that a child does not have a fundamental right to be born 
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regulation of DRT.  Yet, an even greater source of concern is the vast and growing 
number of children born every year in the United States from DRT10 who, to their and 
their families’ misfortune, might become a part of such a tragedy.11  According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2006 there were 5,393 babies born 
in the United States from donated eggs and embryos.12  There is no current data regarding 
the number of babies born from donated sperm,13 but a survey conducted by the former 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated the number of births from artificial 
insemination (AI) by a donor at 30,000 per year in 1986-87.14  In 1998, the ISLAT 
                                                                                                                                            
as a whole, functional human being); Paretta v. Medical Officers for Human Reproduction, 760 
N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (re-stating that a child does not have the right to be born 
free of genetic defects, regardless of how she was conceived, and thus, that a DRT child born 
with CF did not suffer a legally cognizable injury and her parents did not have a valid claim for 
damages for the emotional distress they experienced as a result of having a child with a genetic 
disease).  
10 See Elizabeth A. Conrad et al., Current Practices of Commercial Cryobanks in Screening 
Prospective Donors for Genetic Disease and Reproductive Risk, 41 Int. J. Fertil. 298, 303 (1996); 
see also CDC, Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates—National Summary and 
Fertility Clinics Reports 2004, 52 (2006) [hereinafter CDC 2004 Report]; Peggy Orenstein, Your 
Gamete, Myself, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 15, 2007, at 36. 
11 There are no official statistics regarding the transmission of genetic diseases through DRT.  
See Conrad, supra note 10, at 299.  Thus, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the risks of genetic 
diseases involved in using DRT.  
12 See CDC, 2006 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and 
Fertility Clinic Reports 59 (2008).  Unofficial estimates currently speak of 7,000-10,000 births 
from egg donation a year. 
13 The author is not aware of any source of statistical data regarding the number of donor 
sperm specimens sold or of babies born from such DRT yearly in the United States.  The 
legislation authorizing CDC to collect information from “embryo laboratories” regarding egg 
donations and IVF success rates does not apply to sperm donations and sperm use success rates.  
See infra notes 32-33.  Thus, there are no official statistics regarding the number of semen 
specimens sold and children resulting from artificial insemination (AI) in the United States each 
year. 
14 See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Artificial Insemination Practice in the United 
States: Summary of a 1987 Survey 3 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter OTA 1988 Survey].  According to 
the survey, in 1986-87, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination, resulting in about 
65,000 births, 35,000 of which were from artificial insemination by the husband.  See id.  
With respect to DRT, one should distinguish between “directed donations,” in which the 
recipient receives DRT from a person whom she knows and is known by prior and unrelated to 
seeking the donation, and anonymous donations, in which the recipient does not know the identity 
of the donor (or—in case the donor agrees to expose his/her identity—the recipient knows who 
the donor is but did not know him or her prior to the acquisition of the DRT).  It is important to 
note that the discussion of DRT in this article focuses almost exclusively on anonymous 
donations. 
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Working Group estimated that egg and sperm donations account for more than 60,000 
births every year.15  Yet, despite the significance of these numbers, there is a dearth of 
state law16 and a total lack of federal law regulating the genetic aspects of DRT.17  Court 
decisions addressing the failure of DRT institutions18 to screen and test donors for genetic 
                                                
15 See ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 652.  Due to a lack of accurate data, it is 
difficult to determine whether these numbers have grown or dropped as a result of  advancements 
in ART.  Regardless, it is clear that the number of DRT children is very significant.  See Judith F. 
Daar & Robert G. Brzyski, Genetic Screening of Sperm and Oocyte Donors: Ethical and Policy 
Implications, 301 JAMA 1702, 1702 (2009) (reporting that nearly 3 in every 100 births in the 
United States is attributable to some form of assisted conception and arguing that the numbers of 
births using DRT have been steadily increasing since the introduction of IVF in 1978). 
16 Only two states—New York, and Ohio—require genetic screening and testing of DRT 
donors for some genetic diseases.  See infra Part II.B.  
17 See Maron et al., supra note 5, at 1681, 1683 (describing a series of cases in which a 
genetically inherited disease was transmitted through anonymous sperm donation and 
characterizing this type of risk as “a problem largely unappreciated by the medical community 
and agencies regulating tissue donation”; “[a]lthough not required by FDA, some sperm banks 
test for cystic fibrosis, thalassemia anemia, sickle cell trait, Tay-Sachs, and other genetic diseases 
. . . ”) (emphases added).   
In this article, the term “genetic aspects of DRT” includes (1) screening and testing of DRT 
donors based on genetic criteria, (2) keeping genetic information on record, (3) informing DRT 
recipients about relevant donor genetic information and its potential ramifications, and (4) 
notification of proper authorities and institutions engaging in collection and distribution of DRT 
and recipients of adverse events having a genetic background or suspected as having a genetic 
background.  For purposes of this article, this term does not apply to genetic aspects of any 
infectious diseases, e.g., viral infection (such as HIV, herpes, etc.) that influences the nucleic acid 
makeup of human cells.   
The term “genetic aspects of DRT” also does not include the genetic screening and testing of 
potential DRT recipients.  Arguably, genetic screening and testing of DRT recipients would be 
less cost-effective and more cumbersome than the screening and testing of potential DRT donors.  
This is because DRT donors (mostly sperm donors) are normally the source of a large number of 
DRT specimens used to conceive many DRT children while any DRT recipient would normally 
have a few children at most.  Admittedly, only a minority of the candidates eventually become 
DRT donors, yet DRT programs may test only potential donors that make it through earlier 
selection stages.  Also, a requirement for genetic screening and testing of potential DRT donors 
rather than DRT recipients is more feasible and more defensible from a privacy perspective 
because DRT donors normally submit themselves to medical evaluations as part of the selection 
process and thus, are more readily available and likely to give their consent to have their genetics 
tested.   
18 For purposes of this article, a DRT institution is any individual or entity engaged in the 
manufacture of DRT; “manufacture,” according to the FDA, includes but is not limited to “any or 
all steps in the recovery, processing, storage, labeling, packaging, or distribution of any human 
cell or tissue, and the screening or testing of the cell or tissue donor.”  See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(e) 
(2005).  DRT institutions include, e.g., sperm banks and institutions that harvest donor oocytes as 
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diseases are sparse and ambivalent.  Thus, the only means of protection from genetic 
disease afforded to DRT children and their families are the standards set by professional 
organizations.19  However, membership in such organizations is purely voluntary and 
non-compliance does not seem to carry any real sanctions.20  Hence, currently, in the 
United States, there is no effective protection of DRT recipients from acquiring 
genetically defective DRT or of DRT children from having such diseases even where 
there are effective means of testing for and preventing the transmission of such diseases.  
Despite repeated warnings since the late 1970s regarding the insufficiency of 
genetic screening and testing of DRT and subsequent calls for regulation,21 there are no 
signs that the current framework of regulation of genetic aspects of DRT (or lack thereof) 
is about to change.  Legislators, in general, are averse to legislating about issues 
pertaining to human reproduction22 and regulators show a similar disinclination.23  It thus 
appears that no one is going to address this void unless forced to do so by the occurrence 
of a highly publicized tragedy.  Furthermore, additional discoveries of genetic bases of 
diseases and development of means of testing for such diseases in the future would only 
accentuate the problems existing under the current regulatory scheme.  Fortunately, there 
is a way to correct the situation and fill the regulatory vacuum before more tragedies 
occur.  
On May 25, 2005 the FDA promulgated regulations pertaining to communicable 
disease aspects of DRT, including requiring the screening and testing of DRT donors for 
infectious diseases.24  Yet, the FDA refrained from taking similar steps with respect to the 
genetic aspects of DRT.25  I argue that by stepping into the area of regulation of DRT, the 
                                                                                                                                            
well as small clinics that serve smaller populations so long as they manufacture donor DRT.  This 
definition of DRT, however, does not include clinics that merely harvest DRT for directed 
donations.  
19 See infra Part IV (discussing professional standards set by the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB)). 
20 See infra notes 181 and 196 and accompanying text.  
21 See infra Part II.D.1. 
22 See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands—Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Reproduction, 339 
New Eng. J. Med. 935, 937 (1998); Stacy Huse, The Need for Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 
35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 555, 556 (1996-1997).  
23 See Cynthia B. Cohen, Unmanaged Care: The Need to Regulate New Reproductive 
Technologies in the United States, 11 Bioethics 348, 357 (1997); Richard A. Merrill, Human 
Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New Technologies Challenge FDA, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & 
Pol’y 1, 63 n.332 (2002). 
24 FDA, Guidance for Industry, Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, 
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 69 F.R. 29786-01 (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter FDA 
Final Donor Eligibility Rule].  
25 The FDA provided no explanation for its avoidance of the area of genetic aspects of DRT.  
See infra Part IV (discussing possible reasons for the FDA’s inaction).  
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FDA has created the necessary infrastructure for expanding its regulatory scheme to 
include the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT and has positioned itself as the 
preferable regulator of this area.  The FDA’s authority under the Public Health Service 
Act (PHSA)26 provides it with ample authority to regulate not only the communicable 
diseases aspects of DRT but also their genetic aspects, as is done in other countries.  This 
article makes the case for such federal regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT by the 
FDA.  
Part II of this Article will describe the current regulation of DRT in the United 
States with emphasis on its genetic aspects and the compelling public policy reasons for 
the regulation of this area.  Part III will survey the regulation of genetic screening and 
testing of DRT in the European Union, the United Kingdom and Ireland and highlight 
some of the mechanisms they employ to overcome reoccurring problems typical to such 
regulation.  Implementing some of the mechanisms applied abroad to the unique 
circumstances of the United States, Part IV will offer a framework for the regulation of 
genetic aspects of DRT by the FDA and will discuss some of the issues involved in and 
obstacles to such regulation.  Part V will conclude this Article with a call for the FDA to 
rise to the challenge of filling the regulatory vacuum.  
II. THE REGULATION OF GENETIC SCREENING AND TESTING OF DONATED REPRODUCTIVE 
TISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The regulation of DRT in the United States has been repeatedly described as 
lacking in its protection of DRT recipients and DRT children.27  This Part will explain 
why this criticism is particularly justified with respect to the regulation of the genetic 
aspects of DRT.   
A. Federal Regulation 
Although the federal government has regulated several aspects of ART,28 there is 
no federal law addressing the genetic aspects of DRT.  The lack of such regulation is 
peculiar in light of the federal government’s actual involvement in the regulation of two 
aspects of DRT, specifically the creation of a model program for the accreditation of 
fertility clinics to be carried out by the states29 and the regulation of DRT as human 
                                                
26 Public Health Service Act (PHSA), Ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (July 1, 1944), codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 201–300, Ch. 6A. 
27 See generally OTA, Infertility: Medical and Social Choices 24-26 (1988) [hereinafter OTA’s 
Infertility Report]; Huse, supra note 22, at 571-72; Charles Marwick, Artificial Insemination 
Faces Regulation, Testing of Donor Semen, Other Measures, 260 JAMA 1339 (1988); Judith 
Lynn Bick Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1055 (1985). 
28 See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.2. 
29 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39374.   
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tissue.30  Both regulatory schemes stop just short of addressing the genetic aspects of 
DRT.  
1. The Regulation of ART by the CDC  
In 1992, concerned with information indicating that some fertility clinics misled 
patients by making false and exaggerated representations of success rates in achieving 
pregnancies and provided substandard services,31 Congress legislated the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA).32  FCSRCA instructed the CDC 
to develop a model program for the accreditation of embryo laboratories33 which would 
be carried out by the states.34  The CDC published the Model Program devised under 
FCSRCA in the Federal Register on July 21, 1999.35  Although FCSRCA strove to 
regulate the quality of embryo laboratories, it did not include any requirement for the 
assurance of the safety of the procedures employed by such laboratories, and so neither 
did the resulting CDC Model Program.36  Thus, although Congress may have sought to 
protect consumers acquiring the services of fertility clinics from false representations and 
poor quality of services,37 it neglected to create a more comprehensive regulatory scheme 
that would protect DRT recipients and DRT children from such hazardous practices as 
improper testing of DRT for genetic diseases.   
                                                
30 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2009) [hereinafter Human Tissue Regulations].  
31 See S. Rep. No. 102-452, at 2565-67 (1992); 137 Cong. Rec. E4145-02 (1991) (statement of 
Rep. Wyden).  
32 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (1992).  
33 FCSRCA § 8 defines an “embryo laboratory” as “a facility in which human oocytes are 
subject to assisted reproductive technology treatment or procedures based on manipulation of 
oocytes or embryos which are subject to implantation.”  42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (1992). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2 (2008).  
35 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39374. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(d) (2008). 
37 See note 31 supra.  Notably, Congress was well aware that FCSRCA was far from 
providing a sufficiently comprehensive protection for ART consumers in general, and in 
particular with respect to genetic aspects of DRT.  Addressing the House of Representatives in his 
presentation of FCSRCA, Rep. Wyden said: “I would like to alert my colleagues to another area 
deserving of vigorous Congressional oversight—the $170 million artificial insemination industry.  
A study by the Office of Technology Assessment has revealed a startling lack of oversight, 
particularly in doctor’s offices, which could have significant adverse public health effects. . . . 
[H]alf [of the physicians who provide AI services] don’t screen for genetic defects.”  137 Cong. 
Rec. E4145-02 (1991) (statement of Rep. Wyden). 
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Even further demonstrating its lack of effectiveness, the CDC Model Program is 
only voluntary for states38 and embryo laboratories alike.39  Thus, even had the CDC 
Model Program been sufficiently comprehensive, it would probably not have contributed 
to the safety of DRT children.  
2. The FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations 
Repeated calls for a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of donated 
tissue, including DRT,40 prompted the FDA to announce in March 1997 that it intended 
to create a regulatory scheme for “cellular and tissue based products”41 (including DRT) 
which would include donor eligibility standards and donor screening and testing 
requirements.42  After a lengthy “notice and comment” process,43 in January 2001 the 
FDA published the first of three installments of regulations that would eventually become 
                                                
38 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(e) (2008).  Under the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, the federal 
government may not instruct the states to adopt legislation but rather may merely try to convince 
them to do so through incentives. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997).  Hence FCSRCA could not compel the 
states to apply for the CDC Model Program.  Notably, except for coverage of inspections of 
fertility institutions by funds collected from participating DRT institutions, the CDC Model 
Program does not seem to include any real incentive for the states to apply to participate in it.  See 
FCSRCA § 7; CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39382.  This lack of incentive may account, 
at least in part, for the fact that no state has submitted a request with the CDC to join the Model 
Program.  Telephone Interview with CDC Division of Reproductive Health Helpdesk 
representative, Feb. 23, 2010 (on file with author). 
39 See CDC Model Program, supra note 4, at 39382.  
40 See FDA, Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue (Feb. 1997) [hereinafter Reinventing 
the Regulation of Human Tissue], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/RegulationofTissues/ucm136
967.htm.   
41 See generally Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: 
Availability and Public Meeting, 62 Fed. Reg. 9721 (FDA Mar. 4, 1997) [hereinafter FDA’s 
Proposed Approach].  Notably, as early as 1993, the FDA published an interim rule that required 
the screening and testing of some human tissue for HIV and hepatitis.  See Human Tissue 
Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65514 (FDA Dec. 14, 1993).  However, this rule, 
whose final version was published in 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 40429 (FDA July 29, 1997), did not 
apply to DRT.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3(j)(5) (2005).  
42 See Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue, supra note 40, at 1 (“The agency would 
require infectious disease screening and testing be done for cells and tissues transplanted from 
one person to another.”).  
43 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (describing the process); 69 Fed. Reg. 29786, 
29786-87 (FDA May 25, 2004) (same).  
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the Human Tissue Regulations,44 which required all DRT institutions to register with the 
FDA.45  In May 2004, the FDA published its draft Donor Eligibility Rule,46 which 
eventually went into effect on May 25, 2005.47  
Under the FDA’s Final Donor Eligibility Rule, DRT banks must make donor 
eligibility determinations48 based on donor screening and testing for an array of infectious 
diseases that might pass to children born through the use of DRT, including HIV-1 and 
HIV-2, human cytomegalovirus, hepatitis B and C, syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, West 
Nile virus and more.49  Such donor eligibility determinations must be based on an 
assessment of the donor’s risk factors in light of his or her medical records50 and the 
results of tests performed on the donated tissue,51 with additional specific requirements 
                                                
44 Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products: Establishment of 
Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).  
45 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2005).  For inclusion of DRT institutions in the Human Tissue 
Regulations, see 21 C.F.R. § 1270.10(a)(4)(i)(c).  According to the FDA’s Human Cell and 
Tissue Establishment Registration (HCTERS), as of May 2009 there were 554 establishments 
involved in the recovery, processing and distribution of semen and 472 establishments involved 
in recovery, processing and distribution of oocytes registered with the FDA.  See FDA, Find a 
Tissue Establishment, http://www.fda.gov/cber/tissue/tissregdata.htm (last visited May 9, 2010). 
46 See generally FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24. 
47 Id. at 29786.  The third “installation” of the Human Tissue Regulations was published in its 
final form in Nov. 2004 and became effective on May 25, 2005.  See Current Good Tissue 
Practice for Human Cell, Tissue, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Product Establishments: 
Inspection and Enforcement, 69 Fed. Reg. 68612 (FDA Nov. 24, 2004).   
48 21 C.F.R § 1271.50 (2005).  
49 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.3(r), 1271.50, 1271.75, 1271.80, 1271.85 (2005).  See also FDA, Testing 
HCT/P Donors: Specific Requirements, 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm151757.htm 
(last visited June 17, 2010).  Tissue manufacturers are also under an obligation to screen and test 
donors for diseases not enumerated in the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule that (1) carry a risk of 
transmission, (2) potentially have sufficiently severe effects and (3) may be screened or tested for.  
See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(r)(2) (2005).  
50 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2005).  Although the regulations do not mention specific “risk factors” 
that would render a person ineligible to donate tissue, such risk factors are enumerated in a 
“Guidance for Industry” document released by the FDA in February 2007.  See Guidance for 
Industry: Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products: Availability, 72 Fed. Reg. 9007 (FDA Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter FDA’s 
Guidance for Industry Announcement]. 
51 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85 (2005).  
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set forth for the testing of DRT.52  “A donor whose specimen tests reactive”53 or who is 
“identified as having . . . [a] risk factor for or clinical evidence of any”54 of the diseases 
enumerated in the Human Tissue Regulations is deemed ineligible to donate.55  In 
addition, tissue manufacturers must investigate and report to the FDA any serious adverse 
reaction related to donated tissue.56  Notably, the FDA’s Final Donor Eligibility Rule was 
complemented by a “Guidance for Industry,”57 which reflected the “FDA’s current 
thinking” on eligibility determination by tissue manufacturers.58  
Despite its outspoken intention to create a comprehensive regulatory framework 
for cells and tissue-based products, which “would provide physicians and patients with 
the assurance of safety that the public has come to expect from . . . products overseen by 
the FDA,”59 from the outset, the FDA narrowed the possible scope of its regulatory 
scheme and limited it to the prevention of infectious diseases.60  Most importantly, in 
                                                
52 DRT must also be tested for Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhea.  See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1271.85(c) (2005).  
53 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80(d)(1) (2005).  
54 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75(d)(1) (2005).  
55 Notably, there are exceptions to this rule.  For instance, when DRT is donated by a sexually 
intimate partner of the recipient for reproductive use the rule does not apply.  See 21 C.F.R. § 
1271.90(a) (2005).   
56 21 C.F.R. § 1271.350 (2005).  
57 See FDA’s Guidance for Industry Announcement, supra note 50, at 1.  
58 Id.  It is important to note that according to the FDA, the Guidance for Industry “does not 
create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public” 
but is rather a detailed explanation of the FDA’s expectations from tissue manufacturers with 
respect to their duties under the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule.  Id. 
59 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5448 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001); FDA’s Proposed Approach, supra note 
41, at 7.  See also Tissue Banks: is the Federal Government’s Oversight Adequate: Hearing 
before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 106 (2001) (statement by Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation 
and Research, FDA), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:73395.pdf [hereinafter Zoon Statement] 
(“FDA can assure the Committee that we are committed to establishing a regulatory framework, 
which not only helps to ensure the safe use of human tissue for transplantation, but also . . . 
instills public confidence.”); Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue, supra note 40 (“FDA . 
. . has designed a new regulatory framework for cells and tissues that would protect the public 
health . . . .”).  
60 In its Proposed Approach, the FDA described five public health and regulatory concerns, 
which do not lend themselves to any reading that would include the prevention of spreading of 
genetic diseases.  See FDA’s Proposed Approach, supra note 41, at 9.  Moreover, in addressing 
safety and efficacy aspects of human tissues having “reproductive function,” the FDA’s Proposed 
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promulgating the Final Donor Eligibility Rule, the FDA relied only on PHSA § 361,61 
which grants it authority to promulgate regulations “necessary to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases”62 and which has no 
bearing on the prevention of transmission of genetic diseases.63  Similarly, the FDA 
structured its new regulatory scheme in a way that includes DRT under a new FDA-
invented category of “minimally manipulated tissue,”64 which is subject only to 
regulation under the Human Tissue Regulations.65 
Interestingly, at least at one time, the FDA considered the possibility of requiring 
the testing of DRT for genetic diseases.66 It is unknown why the FDA ultimately did not 
address this issue at all.67  As I will show later in this Article, this exclusion of genetic 
aspects of DRT from the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations was not only undesirable 
                                                                                                                                            
Approach plainly stated that “[f]ailure of reproductive tissue generally does not have life-
threatening or systemic adverse effects except for fertility per se.”  Id. at 20.  This statement does 
not seem to consider the possible adverse effects that genetically compromised DRT might have 
on DRT children.  
61 See 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5449 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).  
62 See PHSA § 361 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2008)); infra note 278 and accompanying 
text.  The authority under PHSA § 361 was originally granted to the Surgeon General and was 
later transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Health who delegated it to the FDA.  See 66 Fed. 
Reg. 5447, 5449 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001).   
63 See infra Part IV.A.  Consequently, for example, the requirement in the Human Tissue 
Regulations to evaluate the donor’s medical history only applies to the donor’s own medical 
history and not to that of her family.  21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(n) (2005).  Similarly, the Human Tissue 
Regulations do not include any requirement for testing of potential DRT donors for any genetic 
conditions.   
64 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f) (2005).  The term “minimally manipulated tissue” designates tissue 
that did not undergo substantial processing.  Under § 1271.3(f)(2), DRT is considered minimally 
manipulated tissue.  
65 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a)(4)(ii)(c) (2005).  This diminished regulatory burden exempts DRT 
from additional, possibly more stringent and comprehensive, regulatory requirements under 
PHSA.  
66 See Letter from Diane E. Thompson, Associate Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, 
DHHS, to Bernice Steinhardt, Director, HEHS, GAO (Oct. 23, 1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98025.pdf (warning against the insufficiency of the FDA’s 
existing regulation and proposed regulatory approach with respect to the risk of introduction of 
genetic diseases through DRT).  
67 Notably, a report issued in 2007 by the FDA appointed Human Tissue Task Force did not 
even mention the issue of genetic screening and testing of DRT.  See Press Release, FDA, FDA 
Releases Human Tissue Task Force Report (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter HTTF Report], available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108932.htm.   
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from a public policy perspective but also could have been avoided had the FDA used a 
different set of authorities available to it to regulate DRT in general.68  
B. State Regulation 
Although state law has traditionally regulated most aspects of public health and 
the licensing of medical personnel and facilities,69 most states do not require any level of 
screening or testing of DRT for genetic diseases.70  Roughly half of the states have some 
kind of regulation pertaining to the screening and testing of DRT donors for infectious 
diseases,71 yet only two states—New York and Ohio72—impose requirements on DRT 
institutions to screen and test DRT for genetic risk factors.73  
                                                
68 See infra Part IV.A.  
69 See Kathleen M. Peterson, Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination Donor Screening 
Practices: An Opportunity for Law to Co-Evolve with Medicine, 96 Dick. L. Rev 59, 84 (1991).  
70 See Lori B. Andrews & Nannette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic 
Information, 8 Health Matrix 125, 135-36 (1998); Alexander Hecht, Note, The Wild Wild West: 
Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 227, 
252-53 (2001) (noting that most state statutes do not set up requirements regarding donors’ 
medical conditions).  
71 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1644.5 (1989); Del. C. Ann. tit. 16, § 2801 (1988); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 381.0041 (2002); Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-151 (1988); Id. Code Ann. §§ 39-3703 (1988), 
39-5404 (1982), 39-5408 (1986); Id. Admin. Code §§ 16.02.07.004, 16.02.07.009; 20 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2310/2310-325 (2000); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-41-14-5 (1993); 410 IAC § 25-2-2 
(1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.281 (1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1062.1 (1988), 
40:1299.143 (1987); Md. Code Ann., Health – General, § 18-334(e) (1988); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. §§ 333.9123 (1988), 333.16273 (1988), 333.20179 (1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-1008 
(1989); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 168-B:10 (1990), 168-B:14 (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:5C-22 
(1997); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, §§ 52-8.5–52-8.9 (1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 
130A-148 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91 (2000); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 3701.246 
(1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 2151.1 (1988); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 677.370 (1997); 28 Pa. 
Code §§ 27.151 (2002), 27.21a (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws 1956, § 23-18.6.1-12 (2006);Va. Code 
Ann. § 32.1-45.3 (1995); 12 Va. Admin. Code §§ 5-90-240, 5-90-260 (1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
252.15(2)(am)(1) (1995).  Notably, out of these twenty-one states, twelve (Delaware, Georgia, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia) only require the screening and/or testing of DRT for AIDS.  The other twenty nine 
states do not seem to impose any requirement of their own on DRT institutions to screen and/or 
test DRT donors for diseases, whether genetic or communicable.  
72 See supra note 71. 
73 Two more states, Idaho and Oregon, impose a duty on semen donors (only) not to donate if 
they are aware that they have “any disease or defect known by [them] to be transmissible by 
genes.”  See I.C. 39-5404 (1982); O.R.S. § 677.370 (1997).  However, the subjective element of 
these statutory duties seems to make them extremely difficult to enforce.  Indeed, the author is 
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Ohio requires that in order to use semen from an anonymous donor, “[a] complete 
medical history of the donor, including, but not limited to, any available genetic history 
of the donor, [must be] obtained . . . [and] [t]he donor [must undergo] a physical 
examination” within one year prior to the donation.74  In addition, practitioners using 
anonymously donated frozen semen must test the donor’s semen or blood using 
“appropriate” laboratory studies for the genetic diseases Tay-Sachs75 and sickle-cell 
anemia76 and perform karyotyping77 of the DRT.78  Subsequently, the DRT practitioners 
are explicitly required to determine whether the results of such tests “are acceptable.”79  
                                                                                                                                            
unaware of any case in which a donor was prosecuted or sued based on a cause of action 
stemming from these provisions.  
An interesting question is why only New York and Ohio have relatively comprehensive 
regulatory schemes with respect to the genetic aspects of DRT while other states, like 
California—which hosts the nation’s largest DRT institution and several others—do not.  
Different explanations could be offered for the adoption of comprehensive regulation or lack 
thereof.  For example, states with a significant medical industry, such as New York, could be 
expected to have progressive medically-related regulation.  Similarly, states having a significant 
DRT industry, such as California and New York, could be expected to have a strong anti-
regulation lobby.  On the other hand, states having a strong DRT industry may strive to have 
stricter regulation to protect their industry from out-of-state competition.  Yet, none of these 
possible explanations seems to provide a full explanation as to why only New York and Ohio 
adopted relatively comprehensive regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT while other states, 
such as California and Massachusetts, did not.   
74 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(1)(a)-(b) (2000). 
75 Tay-Sachs is a fatal genetic disorder in which harmful quantities of a fatty substance build 
up in tissues and nerve cells in the brain. Infants with Tay-Sachs disease appear to develop 
normally for the first few months of life but then suffer an ongoing deterioration of mental and 
physical abilities until the child’s inevitable death before the age of five.  The incidence of Tay-
Sachs is particularly high among people of Eastern European and Ashkenazi Jewish descent.  
Patients and carriers of Tay-Sachs disease can be identified by a simple blood test.  Tay-Sachs 
disease is an autosomal recessive condition, meaning that in order to have an affected child both 
parents must carry the mutated gene and pass it along to the child, which has a one in four (1:4) 
likelihood of happening with each pregnancy.  See National Institute of Neurological Disorders 
and Stroke, NINDS Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
76 Sickle cell anemia is a disease in which the body makes sickle-shaped red blood cells (i.e. 
red blood cells that are shaped like a “C”) rather than normal disc-shaped blood cells.  Sickle-
shaped cells do not move easily through blood vessels and tend to form clumps and get stuck in 
the blood vessels thus blocking blood flow in the blood vessels that lead to the limbs and organs. 
Blocked blood vessels can cause pain, serious infections, and organ damage.  Like Tay-Sachs 
disease, sickle cell anemia is an autosomal recessive condition.  See Nat’l Heart, Lung and Blood 
Institute, Diseases and Conditions Index, What is Sickle Cell Anemia?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Sca/SCA_WhatIs.html (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).  
77 Karyotyping is a test to examine the number and structure of chromosomes used to diagnose 
numerous types of genetic diseases resulting from irregular chromosome number or structure, 
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While Ohio’s relevant law only applies to the screening and testing of semen,80 
New York’s law also applies to donated eggs, thereby making it the only state in which 
both sperm and oocytes81 are subject to a requirement of screening and testing for genetic 
diseases.82  The New York Regulations require practitioners to “screen and . . . assess 
donors for conditions that may adversely affect the quality of [DRT] or impair the 
recipient's and/or the offspring's health.”83  Under the New York Regulations, such 
screening must include a physical examination of the prospective DRT donor84 as well as 
collection of “[a] complete medical history, both individual and family, including first-
degree and second-degree relatives.”85  The donor and her family’s medical history must 
be evaluated according to numerous criteria including:  (1) the existence of major genetic 
disorders, autosomal or X-linked, dominant or recessive,86 (2) a history of an occupation 
with increased risk of or exposure to radiation or chemicals,87 and (3) other conditions as 
determined by the DRT institution.88  If the donor’s ethnic or racial group or family 
history indicates an increased risk of carrying89 Tay-Sachs disease, thalassemia,90 cystic 
                                                                                                                                            
e.g., Down’s Syndrome.  See Medline Plus, Karyotyping, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003935.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
78 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(2)(b) (2000). 
79 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(2)(c) (2000).  
80 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91 (2000).  
81 Unlike sperm banks, for scientific and technical reasons having to do with difficulties in 
preserving oocytes, “egg banks” essentially only mediate between recipients and potential egg 
donors who are willing to undergo the medical procedures necessary for harvesting their eggs.  
Hence, “egg banks” are not “banks” in the same sense as sperm banks, as they do not store eggs 
for immediate dispensing. 
82 The New York regulations refer to “reproductive tissue” in general.  See N.Y. Comp. Codes 
R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.5 (1991). 
83 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(a).  
84 Id. 
85 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b).  
86 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(2).  
87 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(10).  Such exposure could, supposedly 
increase the prevalence of genetic mutations in the donor’s gametes.  
88 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(b)(13).  
89 For the purposes of the discussion herein, a carrier is an individual who is a heterozygote—
i.e., only has one copy of a recessive allele—for a disease that would only manifest itself if the 
individual has two recessive copies of the gene, e.g., CF, Tay-Sachs, etc.     
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fibrosis and/or sickle cell disease genes, he or she must be tested for these genetic 
conditions.91  All such test results must be made available to the donor, as well as to the 
practitioner who intends to use the DRT.92  
In addition, the New York Regulations require notification of the recipient’s 
physician if, at the time of donation, the donor was older than forty-four in the case of a 
sperm donor or older than thirty-four in the case of an egg donor.93  Furthermore, to avoid 
repeated adverse results caused by DRT use, practitioners must report the outcomes of 
any use, including such adverse results, to the DRT institution which must record them.94  
Finally, the DRT institution must receive informed consent from the recipient “after a 
physician has explained the risks and benefits of the procedure, [and] made available 
details of the medical history of the donor or donors.”95  New York is the only state with 
comprehensive regulation pertaining to the genetic aspects of DRT.   
C. Genetic Screening and Testing of Donated Reproductive Tissue in the Courts 
There are very few reported cases involving claims stemming from deficient 
genetic screening and testing of DRT.96  Yet, the little case law that does exist indicates 
that it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs97 to recover damages for their injuries.98  
                                                                                                                                            
90 Thalassemia is a blood disorder causing the body to make fewer healthy red blood cells and 
less hemoglobin than normal, which could lead to mild to severe anemia.  Beta thalassemia 
occurs when one or both genes are altered and the severity of the disease depends on how badly 
the gene or genes are affected.  Thalassemia occurs most often among people of Italian, Greek, 
Middle Eastern, Asian, and African descent.  Thalassemia is easily diagnosed in a blood test.  See 
Nat’l Heart, Lung and Blood Inst., Diseases and Conditions Index, What Are Thalassemias?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/Thalassemia/Thalassemia_WhatIs.html (last visited 
May 9, 2010).  
91 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.6(h). 
92 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.6(k).  
93 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.5(d).  
94 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.9(e).   
95 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, 52-8.8.  
96 There are, generally, very few reported court cases involving claims of deficient ART 
practices.  Several commentators have argued that this dearth of case law in the area of ART is 
the result of a strong inclination of DRT institutions and practitioners to settle claims against 
them.  See Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry 
in the United States, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 823, 828 (1997) (“The rarity of litigation over unsafe 
artificial insemination techniques . . . may stem from the fact that most of these cases are resolved 
in hushed, out-of-court settlements intended to conceal the risks of [artificial insemination] from 
the public. . . .”); Hecht, supra note 70, at 233-34 (arguing that the likely explanation to the lack 
of litigation is the reproductive industry’s preference for anonymous, out-of-court settlements 
which serves its attempts to avoid “negative headlines that could deter potential customers from 
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Plaintiffs seeking to bring a negligence claim relying on a theory of malpractice 
against DRT institutions or practitioners (defendants) have to show that the defendants 
(1) owed them a duty of care, (2) which the defendants breached, and (3) that the breach 
caused (4) the injury they suffered.99  Yet, it is extremely difficult to prove all of these 
elements in cases involving genetically compromised DRT.100  First, many courts are 
unwilling to recognize the existence of a duty of care to persons who did not yet exist at 
the time the allegedly tortious actions took place.101  Similarly, most jurisdictions are 
unwilling, conceptually, to entertain and flatly reject claims for “wrongful life,” i.e. 
claims that are based on the premise that tortious acts brought about the existence of a 
                                                                                                                                            
undergoing such procedures”); Anita M. Hodgson, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposal 
to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the Performance of Artificial 
Insemination Procedures, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 358, 363-64 (1993) (arguing that the lack of 
litigation arising from improper artificial insemination is the result of “quiet, out-of-court 
settlements designed to prevent anxious consumers from discovering the risks involved in the 
procedure” as well as to protect clinicians’ professional reputations and avoid large judgments by 
sympathetic juries).  It is likely that such a strong inclination to settle cases involving DRT 
institutions and practitioners would also account for the very few cases involving genetic aspects 
of DRT.  Regardless of the reason, the few cases that actually address human reproduction (not 
just in the context of the genetic aspects of DRT) demonstrate not only a plethora of different 
approaches but also sharp inconsistencies in analysis and results between different courts 
(sometimes even in the same jurisdiction). See Matthew Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an 
Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2555, 2588-
91, 2596-97 (2001); Hodgson, supra at 361-62 (suggesting a UCC-based breach of warranty 
claim as another possible cause of action for plaintiffs to utilize in litigation since negligence 
claims are often difficult to prove). 
97 The term “plaintiffs” as it is used herein refers to DRT children suffering from genetic 
defects resulting from deficient screening and testing of the donors of the DRT used in their 
conception and their legal parents.  
98 The difficulties faced by plaintiffs may well deter such potential plaintiffs from suing, 
which may, in turn, explain the dearth of case-law in matters involving claims stemming from 
deficient genetic screening and testing of DRT.  
99 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “negligence” as, inter alia, “[a] 
tort grounded in [the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation] . . . expressed in terms of the following elements: 
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages”).  
100 See The President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction and Responsibility, The 
Regulation of New Biotechnologies 70-71 (2004) [hereinafter Council on Bioethics Report], 
available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/index.html.  
101 See Browne, supra note 96, at 2555-56, 2558, 2563 (arguing that existing case law 
illustrates that a doctor-patient relationship between the physician and a potential mother “does 
not automatically create a duty of care flowing from the doctor to the patient’s future child”). 
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severely injured person who would have otherwise (i.e., but for the allegedly wrongful 
acts) not existed.102   
Second, the lack of regulatory standards with respect to the duties of DRT 
institutions and practitioners to screen and test DRT for genetic diseases, report adverse 
events, etc., both at the federal and state level,103 makes it difficult to establish the 
existence of a duty of care owed by such potential defendants to injured DRT children 
                                                
102 Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “wrongful-life action”).  The reason 
for what appears to be courts’ aversion to “wrongful life” claims is the result of what came to be 
known as the “non-identity problem.”  See generally C. Foster, T. Hope & J. McMillan, 
Submissions from Non-Existent Claimants: The Non-Identity Problem and the Law, 25 Med. & L. 
159 (2006) (explaining how courts dismiss wrongful life claims because of the non-identity 
problem). A good illustration of how most courts approach wrongful life claims is the case of 
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).  Becker involved two cases:  in one, a couple 
sued for giving birth to a child suffering from Down’s Syndrome after not being informed by 
their doctors of the increased risk of Down’s Syndrome in women over 35 years of age or about 
the availability of the amniocentesis test.  Id. at 896.  In the second case, a couple who gave birth 
to a child with polycystic kidney disease, who died five hours after birth, were allegedly told by 
their obstetricians that the disease was not hereditary, which was not the case.  See supra note 8.  
As a result, the couple became pregnant again and gave birth to a child who also suffered from 
PKD and who died from it at the age of two and a half years.  Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 896.  Both 
couples sued for “wrongful life,” claiming that had it not been for their physicians’ actions and 
omissions they would have chosen not to give birth to or conceive their injured child.  The New 
York Court of Appeals (the highest court of New York State) held that both complaints “failed to 
state legally cognizable causes of action” because “it [did] not appear that the infants suffered any 
legally cognizable injury.” Id. at 811-12.  With respect to the parents’ causes of action, the Court 
of Appeals ruled that it is impossible to assess their damages since “notwithstanding the birth of a 
child afflicted with an abnormality . . . parents may yet experience a love that even an 
abnormality cannot fully dampen.  To assess damages for emotional harm endured by the parents 
of such a child would, in all fairness, require consideration of this factor in mitigation of the 
parents’ emotional injuries” which remains “too speculative to permit recovery.” Id. at 814.  
Judge Wachtler expressed an even stricter opinion that “a doctor who provides prenatal care to an 
expectant mother should not be held liable if the child is born with a genetic defect” because “the 
physician cannot be said to have caused the defect.” Id. at 816 (Wachtler J., dissenting in part).  
See also Browne, supra note 96, at 2558 (arguing that some courts find the policy considerations 
involved in a finding of a pre-conception tort to be “so momentous” that they prefer leaving such 
a decision to the legislature), 2588-97 (pointing at the inconsistency of analytical approaches and 
outcomes between different jurisdictions and courts with respect to children who “enter the world 
‘carrying the seal of another’s fault’”). 
Compare this situation to other types of reproduction related causes of action which do not 
raise the non-identity problem such as actions for failure to provide appropriate treatment to a 
fetus in-utero (“regular” negligence) or failure to advise parents about the risks of having a child 
with birth defects.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “wrongful-birth 
action” as “[a] lawsuit brought by parents against a doctor for failing to advise them prospectively 
about the risks of their having a child with birth defects.”).   
103 See supra Parts II.A-B.  
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and their families.104  Last, there is inherent difficulty in proving that the acts and 
omissions of the defendants, rather than the genetic qualities of the DRT used, were the 
cause of a DRT child’s injuries.105  
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid the hardships involved in bringing a negligence action 
against a DRT institution might find that they have very few, if any, other possible 
avenues of recourse.  They usually cannot sue a DRT donor who failed to report a genetic 
disease that eventually passed to the DRT child because the secrecy in which such private 
medical information is normally kept makes it very difficult to obtain.106  Furthermore, 
almost every state excludes breach of warranty causes of action in matters involving 
human tissues, including cases where deficient DRT screening and testing practices 
would have otherwise constituted a breach of warranty by defendants.107  Moreover, 
those plaintiffs who overcome the above-described legal hurdles, and eventually sue for 
damages, might encounter an overtly unsympathetic and sometimes even scornful court 
that might refuse (or fail) to accept the proposition that defendants’ mistakes and 
omissions constituted negligence.108  Ultimately, the genetically injured DRT children 
                                                
104 See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 361-62.  As discussed infra, Part II.D, with the narrow 
exception of the states of Ohio and New York, the only standards existing in this respect are non-
committing self imposed inter-industry guidelines.  See Andrews & Elster, supra note 70, at 136. 
Courts, however, might not consider such standards authoritative enough to be indicative of the 
existence of a duty of care in malpractice claims.  See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 
249.  For an explanation of the inherent difficulty in proving the existence of a duty in situations 
where no established standard of care exists, see The Food and Drug Law Institute, The 
Regulation of Human Tissues and Organs, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 1, 150 (1990) [hereinafter 
Human Tissues and Organs] (presentation of Geoffrey R.W. Smith).  Notably, while it is a “well 
known tort doctrine that proof of compliance with the applicable ‘industry’ standard will not 
insulate a defendant from liability when the standard itself is inadequate,” the author is unaware 
of any case that even mentions the fertility industry’s guidelines with respect to genetic screening 
and testing of DRT as a possible standard of care.  Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 (10th Cir. 
1979).  
105 See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 816 (Wachtler J., dissenting in part).  
106 See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 249; see also infra Part II.C.1(discussing 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
107 As far back as 1993, Hodgson pointed out the shortcomings of this policy with respect to 
the screening and testing practices of DRT and called for its abandonment and for the application 
of the U.C.C. to sperm transactions.  See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364-86.  Yet, this policy, 
which essentially views transactions between DRT banks and consumers as performance of 
“services” rather than as “sales,” remains in place.  See Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant 
Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229-30 (D. Utah 2002) (“No court has ever applied strict liability 
to the distribution of human tissue . . . . This is consistent with a general policy throughout the 
nation . . . against applying strict liability to the distribution of human tissue.”); Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 19(c) and cmt. c. (1998); but see I.C. § 39-3702 (1987) (excepting 
paid sale of organs and tissue from the application of this rule).  
108 See Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998).  Harnicher involved a 
“mix-up” of a chosen donor’s sperm with that of another donor, leading to the birth of triplets 
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and their families are left to bear not only the suffering but also, at least to some extent, 
the costs and damages resulting from the DRT children’s injuries.  Two relatively recent 
cases exemplify many of the abovementioned problems and difficulties in litigating 
claims stemming from deficient genetic screening and testing of DRT donors.  
1. Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
In the first case exemplifying the difficulties experienced by plaintiffs suing for 
the mishandling of genetic aspects of DRT, Diane and Ronald Johnson bought sperm 
from the California sperm bank Cryobank.109  A successful insemination led to the birth 
of a girl (Brittany) who, six years later, was diagnosed with a severe form of ADPKD.110  
Since ADPKD is an autosomal dominant disease of which the Johnsons had no family 
history, they suspected that the disease was transferred to their daughter from the sperm 
donor.111  After long and burdensome legal proceedings,112 it was eventually revealed that 
                                                                                                                                            
who did not resemble their recipient-father thus thwarting recipients’ intention to believe and 
represent that the “recipient-father” is the biological father of the DRT children.  The recipients 
sued for malpractice, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress due to the fact that they 
have “suffered severe anxiety, depression, grief, and other mental and emotional suffering and 
distress which has adversely affected their relationship with the children and with each other.”  
Id. at 68.  The Utah Supreme Court chose to accept the trial court’s holding that despite an expert 
opinion stating that plaintiffs have suffered physical symptoms as a result of their distress, they 
failed to convince the court that they have indeed suffered such injuries and thus cannot recover.  
Id. at 70-71.  Notably, in affirming the trial court’s findings, the Utah Supreme Court observed 
that “[plaintiffs] became the parents of three normal, healthy children whom the couple suggest 
do not look as much like [the recipient-father] as different children might have and whose blood 
type could not be descended from his.  This result thwarted the couple’s intention to believe and 
represent that the triplets are [the recipient-father’s] biological children.  Exposure to the truth 
about one’s own situation cannot be considered an injury and has never been a tort.  Therefore, 
destruction of a fiction cannot be grounds for either malpractice or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.” Id. at 72 (emphasis added).  Contrast, however, the insightful dissent of 
Associate Chief Justice Durham, who argued that “[the majority’s conviction that the loss of an 
unassailable assurance that one’s children carry one’s genes is of negligible value] is belied by 
the extraordinary lengths to which thousands of people in this era will go to pursue biological 
parenthood” and that “[m]ost troubling. . . and unnecessary to the result of the majority opinion is 
its general tone of disdain for and belittlement of the nature of the suffering claimed by 
[plaintiffs].  This loss of genetic continuity is an important factor for the husband to discuss and 
to accept.  No matter how well the donor is matched to the husband, this loss is real and has to be 
grieved over . . . .”  Id. at 75, 77-78.  
109 See generally Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  
110 According to a declaration from Brittany’s doctor, she had “cysts [on her kidneys] . . . and 
clearly has a highly penetrant form of ADPKD. . . .  [S]he [will] likely progress much more 
rapidly than most patients with ADPKD who don’t develop cysts until their 4th or 5th decade of 
life.”  Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson I), 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
111 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.  
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Cryobank’s personnel, who interviewed the donor, knew that he had a family medical 
history that indicated the existence of ADPKD.113  Still, Cryobank accepted him as a 
donor without further investigation to determine whether he might indeed carry the 
ADPKD gene, and later sold his sperm to the Johnsons without warning them about the 
possible genetic risks involved.114  Furthermore, Cryobank represented to the Johnsons 
that the sperm “had been tested and screened for infectious and ‘reasonably detectable 
genetically transferred’ diseases and medical abnormalities and therefore could safely be 
used.”115  
The Johnsons sued Cryobank and its employees for failing to disclose that the 
sperm they had used came from a donor with a family history of ADPKD, fraud, breach 
of contract and, later, also filed a motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for 
punitive damages.116  The trial court rejected the Johnsons’ fraud claim, held that Brittany 
was not entitled to recover general damages or damages for lost earnings, and denied the 
Johnsons’ motion to add punitive damages to their claim.117   
On appeal, while acknowledging that there were substantial policy reasons in 
favor of allowing for punitive damages, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the Johnsons’ motion to add punitive damages to their claim.118  Most 
importantly, the California Court of Appeals subscribed to the trial court’s 
characterization of Brittany’s claim as one for “wrongful life” and thus held that under 
California Supreme Court case law she was not entitled to recover general damages or 
damages for lost earnings.119  In making this decision, the Court of Appeals “recognize[d] 
                                                                                                                                            
112 The Johnsons sought to discover the identity and medical record of their donor.  See 
Johnson I, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.  After a long struggle, the California Court of Appeals 
eventually was willing to compel the donor to appear at a deposition to answer questions and 
produce documents regarding his medical condition and his family’s medical history, but without 
having to expose his identity.  See Johnson I, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875, 878-79; Johnson II, 124 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654-55.   
113 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (“[The donor’s] affirmative answers to the questions 
concerning the presence of kidney disease in his mother and his aunt/uncle were circled, a 
question mark was written next to each ‘X,’ and the notation ‘at risk for kidney disease’ was 
written directly above the ‘X’ denoting his mother’s kidney disease.”). 
114 Id. at 654. 
115 Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (Cal. Ct. App.2002). 
116 Id. at 653-54.  
117 Id. at 654-56,  
118 See id. at 656-64 .   
119 Id. at 664-66.  The Court of Appeals explained that since it cannot be said that Defendants 
caused Brittany’s inherited abnormalities, wherein these abnormalities were caused by the 
defective donated gene, under Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) and Andalon v. 
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the harshness of the rules set forth [by the California Supreme Court] but was admittedly 
‘bound’ by them.”120  Eventually, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further 
proceedings addressing only the Johnsons’ negligence and fraud claims.121  After almost 
another ten months of procedural back and forth in the trial court and almost seven years 
after the Johnsons filed their original claim, the parties settled the case for $1,250,000, of 
which Brittany and her parents eventually received, after deductions of expenses and 
attorneys’ fees, $750,440.56.122   
Perhaps the most disturbing fact in the Johnson case is that according to the 
Johnsons’ complaint, defendants may have sold to other recipients as many as 1,600 
sperm specimens originating from the same donor whose sperm was used to conceive 
Brittany.123  These specimens may have resulted in an unknown number, possibly 
hundreds, of DRT children who might carry the ADPKD gene originating from 
Brittany’s donor, develop ADPKD later in their lives, and pass the ADPKD gene along to 
their own offspring.124  As mentioned earlier, this case was settled so the trial court did 
not proceed to address this allegation.  
2. Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction 
Josephine and Gerard Paretta underwent IVF using an ovum from an egg donor 
who was represented to them as “not hav[ing] a history of mental illness or genetic 
diseases.”125  Although the New York Supreme Court found that “[t]he custom and 
practice of the [ovum donor] program was to screen [and test] donors for various diseases 
                                                                                                                                            
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), Brittany’s damages were the result of 
her coming into being and thus one cannot calculate them in a reasoned non-arbitrary manner.  
120 Johnson II, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666.  
121 Johnson v. Superior Court (Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666 (Cal. Ct. App.2002). 
122 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition Approve Compromise of Claim at 1-2, Johnson v. 
Cal. Cryobank, Inc., No. SC043434 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2003). Of this sum, each parent 
received $250,000 minus a quarter of the expenses and $100,000 attorneys’ fees. Brittany 
received the remainder, $750,000 minus $241,862.22 for additional fees and expenses, leaving 
her with $508,137.78. 
123 See Fourth Amended Complaint for Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation/Suppression, 
Professional Negligence, Unfair Business Practices, at ¶¶ 63-64, 69, Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, 
Inc., No. SC043434 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2003). 
124 Id. 
125 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
Other details given to the Parettas about the donor included “that she was white, a second-time 
donor, a heterosexual, an only child of an Irish father and English mother, a Protestant, that she 
was five feet six inches tall, that she had dark brown hair and brown eyes, was long necked with 
small eyes and ears, that she had a short thin nose, dimples and high cheekbones, and that she did 
not have freckles.” Id.  
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and cystic fibrosis” and to “inform the patient that there was a donor or that a potential 
donor was a carrier,”126 the program did not inform the Parettas that their egg donor was 
a carrier of cystic fibrosis.  Subsequently, Mr. Paretta, who provided the sperm for the 
fertilization, did not undergo genetic testing to make sure that he was not a carrier of the 
CF gene—which he was—and the baby born from the fertilized egg (Theresa) was 
afflicted with CF.127   
In October 2000, the Parettas, including Theresa, sued the medical centers and 
units involved in their fertilization treatments for medical malpractice for failing to (1) 
properly screen and test the egg, (2) inform the Parettas that it tested positive for the CF 
gene and (3) test Mr. Paretta for the CF gene.128  The parents also sued for emotional pain 
and suffering as parents of a child affected with CF and asked that punitive damages be 
awarded for defendants’ “egregious, grossly negligent and reckless conduct.”129  
Interestingly, the Parettas avoided the difficulties in establishing the causation element of 
their negligence claim by explicitly claiming that it was the defendants who “introduced 
the agent, which caused [cystic fibrosis] and manipulated the embryonic material [that] 
was implanted into Mrs. Paretta.”130   
Relying on the New York Court of Appeals decision in Becker v. Schwartz,131 the 
New York Supreme Court held that Theresa’s claims were for “wrongful birth” and 
denied them in their entirety.132  The Supreme Court further ruled:  
Theresa . . . , like any other baby, does not have a protected right to be 
born free of genetic defects.  A conclusion to the contrary permitting 
infants to recover against doctors for wrongs allegedly committed during 
in vitro fertilization would give children conceived with the help of 
modern medical technology more rights and expectations than children 
conceived without medical assistance.  The law does not recognize such a 
distinction and neither will this court.133 
                                                
126 Id. at 641.  
127 Id. at 641-42.  According to the New York Supreme Court, “[f]or the first two months, 
Theresa was in intensive care.  She underwent several surgeries and wore a colostomy bag for a 
month.  According to plaintiffs she ‘will have to take medication for the rest of her life . . . [and] 
will remain under a doctor’s and/or hospital’s care for the rest of her life.’” Id. at 642. 
128 Id. at 642.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 643.  
131 See supra note 102.  
132 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003).  
133 Id. at 646.  
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The New York Supreme Court also denied the Parettas’ claims for emotional 
distress as a result of their daughter’s birth with a congenital disease.134  Relying once 
again on Becker, the court explained:  
[T]here can be no recovery for the emotional distress a parent may 
experience as a result of having a child with a genetic disease.  There is no 
compelling legal authority permitting a distinction where a child has been 
conceived with the help of a medical technology and is born with a genetic 
disease.  This court cannot treat the emotional distress and psychic pain 
suffered by parents who give birth to a sick child after in vitro fertilization 
any differently from that sustained by other parents.  The emotional 
distress experienced as a result of watching a genetically diseased child 
suffer, horrible as it may be, is the same regardless of how the child was 
conceived.[135]  It unfortunately is not compensable.136 
The New York Supreme Court then went on to dismiss Mr. Paretta’s claim for 
loss of consortium as “predicated on and inextricably interwoven with the emotional 
injuries suffered by Mrs. Paretta.”137  The court did hold, however, that the action did not 
have to be dismissed in its entirety:  that “the Parettas can pursue recovery for the 
pecuniary expense they have borne and continue to bear for the care and treatment of 
their sick infant” and for punitive damages.138  Having limited the Parettas’ claims in this 
manner, the Supreme Court encouraged the Parettas “to vigorously pursue recovery.”139  
The parties proceeded to trial and, similar to the Johnsons, after about ten more months, 
eventually settled their claims for $1,300,000.140 
                                                
134 Id. at 645.  
135 See infra Part II.E. 
136 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 646.  
137 Id. at 647.  
138 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
The New York Supreme Court also did not dismiss Mrs. Paretta’s claims for compensation 
related to her decision to leave her job so that she could care for Theresa on a full-time basis and 
for the reasonable value of her services even though the court stated that it was “far from 
convinced of the viability of recovery of lost earnings.”  Id. 
139 Id. at 648.  
140 The case was settled before trial on Feb. 2, 2004.  See 
http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch (index no. 122555-2000).  The court records 
do not provide any further information about the terms of the settlement. 
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Leaving any critique of the Johnson and Paretta decisions aside,141 these cases 
exemplify not only how restricted the avenues of legal recourse available to injured DRT 
children and their families are, but also how burdensome, time consuming, expensive and 
legally difficult it is to recover for genetic injuries associated with DRT.  Furthermore, 
even if we assume that the settlement amounts in the above cases were sufficient to 
compensate the DRT children and their families for their damages—which is highly 
doubtful142—it is not clear that they are sufficiently high to create a deterrent effect that 
would improve the genetic screening and testing practices of DRT institutions and 
practitioners.  
D. Self Regulation by Professional Organizations 
1. The Need for Genetic Screening and Testing of Donated Reproductive Tissue 
Recognized 
The lack of effective DRT screening and testing practices in the United States and 
the need for further regulation was described as early as 1979 by Martin Curie-Cohen.143  
Curie-Cohen surveyed 711 physicians who indicated that they were “likely to perform 
artificial insemination by [a] donor.”  Of the 471 who responded to the survey, 379 
reported that they actually performed artificial insemination.  According to Curie-Cohen, 
although the risk of genetic diseases was a concern of many recipients, the survey 
revealed very little, if any, screening and testing of donors.144  While many DRT 
practitioners could indicate whether the donor was part of a “select donor pool” (medical 
students automatically qualifying as select), screening was largely superficial.  Though 
96% of the physicians participating in the survey asked questions regarding donors’ 
family medical history, the questioning often did not entail more than asking the donor if 
                                                
141 Some of the courts’ rationales in denying some of the plaintiffs’ causes of action are 
controversial while others simply are not convincing.  For instance, the Johnson court’s decision 
not to allow the Johnsons to add punitive damages to their claim despite the existence of policy 
reasons to the contrary arguably did not allocate enough weight to what appeared to be egregious 
and fraudulent behavior of Cryobank’s personnel in that case.  As for the Paretta court, in 
holding that “[t]he emotional distress experienced as a result of watching a genetically diseased 
child suffer . . . is the same regardless of how the child was conceived” the court seems to have 
simply ignored the fact that it was Defendants’ acts and omissions that led to the birth of Theresa 
with the debilitating genetic disease that brought about the Parettas’ suffering.  See supra notes 
129 and 136 and accompanying text. 
142 For example, the settlement amounts do not reflect the loss of potential earnings of the 
respective DRT children had they not been afflicted with their debilitating genetic disorders.   
143 See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the 
United States, 300 N. Eng. J. Med. 585, 589 (1979).   
144 Id. at 585-86 (“[d]onors of semen were . . . only superficially screened for genetic 
diseases”).  
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there were any genetic diseases in the family.  Also, many of the DRT practitioners 
expressed an underlying expectation that medical student and hospital resident would 
“screen themselves before donating semen.”145  The survey revealed that while 94.7% of 
the physicians said they would reject a carrier of Tay-Sachs disease, only 1% of them 
said that they actually tested donors for it and only 28.8% of the physicians performed 
any biomedical test on donors in addition to blood typing.146  Furthermore, the data 
collected by the survey revealed that many of the physicians had little understanding of 
genetic diseases.  For example, 71.4% of the surveyed physicians said they would 
exclude a healthy donor who had a family history of hemophilia.147  According to Curie-
Cohen, only 37% of physicians surveyed actually kept records about the children born 
from DRT that they provided and only 30% kept any records on donors.148  Curie-Cohen 
concluded that the screening and testing of donors for genetic diseases was inadequate 
and called for the establishment of a list of genetic traits that would be routinely screened 
and tested for, evaluation by “people trained in recognizing and evaluating genetic traits,” 
and a recordkeeping minimum that would include the outcome of pregnancies achieved 
through DRT and paternity.149 
Two case studies published in 1981 further illustrated the dangers of which Curie-
Cohen warned.  In one case, a girl was born with Tay-Sachs disease to a mother of an 
ethnic group in which this disease is not prevalent and the sperm of an anonymous donor, 
who, as it turned out, was a carrier of the disease’s gene.150  In the second case, two 
consecutive artificial inseminations resulted in the transmission of a rare and lethal 
                                                
145 Id. at 586.  
146 Id. at 588. 
147 Id.  Hemophilia is a rare bleeding disorder in which a person’s blood does not clot 
normally.   Hemophilia is caused by a defect in one of the genes located on the X chromosome 
that determine how the body makes blood clotting factors VIII and IX.  Females have two X 
chromosomes, while males have one X and one Y chromosome.  Since only the X chromosome 
carries the genes related to clotting factors a male who has the abnormal gene on his X 
chromosome will have hemophilia while a female must have the abnormal gene on both of her X 
chromosomes to have hemophilia, which is very rare.  This also means that while healthy females 
might be carriers of a hemophilia allele, males cannot possibly be carriers of this allele without 
actually having the disease.  See generally National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute Diseases and 
Conditions Index, What is Hemophilia?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/hemophilia/hemophilia_what.html (last visited May 
9, 2010).  
148 Curie-Cohen, supra note 143, at 588. 
149 Id. at 589.  
150 William Johnson et al., Artificial Insemination by Donors: the Need for Genetic Screening. 
Late-Infantile GM2-Gangliosidosis Resulting From This Technique, 36 N. Eng. J. Med. 572, 755 
(1981). 
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genetic disease to two siblings conceived from the sperm of a single donor.151  Tragically, 
the second insemination, leading to the birth of the second afflicted child, had already 
taken place by the time the doctors diagnosed the lethal disease in the older sibling.  Both 
siblings died very young—at sixteen and three months, respectively—as a result of the 
genetic disease they inherited from the sperm donor.152 
During the 1980s, these data prompted more calls for regulation of DRT in 
general and their genetic aspects in particular.  A 1988 survey of the former Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) revealed that donor screening and testing practices were 
“quite varied.”  For example, while many physicians routinely rejected potential donors 
for such traits as “psychological immaturity,” “less than a high school education” and 
“less than average height,” only about half of the physicians tested any of their potential 
donors for any genetic diseases.153  The OTA 1988 Survey further revealed that only 44% 
of the physicians performing AI required screening and testing for genetic diseases for 
which the potential donors were at high risk.154  The Survey found that while all of the 
fifteen DRT institutions that responded to the survey did some testing of varying nature 
and extent, two of the fifteen DRT banks reviewed did not test for ethnically prevalent 
genetic diseases such as Tay-Sachs, sickle-cell anemia and thalassemia.155  In addition, 
the Survey disclosed that only two-thirds of the DRT banks ever rejected a donor for 
having a family history of a serious genetic disease or for being over forty years of age.156 
Another OTA report published in 1988 further revealed that only 20% of the 
physicians who regularly performed AI indicated that a family history of genetic disease 
would prompt them to require further genetic testing of a potential donor and only 18% 
indicated they would do so with a potential donor from a high risk ethnic group.157  The 
OTA 1988 Infertility Report concluded that “genetic testing is not routine for donors, 
including those in higher than average risk groups.”158   
                                                
151 David Shapiro & Raymond J. Hutchinson, Familial Histiocytosis in Offspring of Two 
Pregnancies after Artificial Insemination, 36 N. Eng. J. Med. 573, 757 (1981).  Shapiro and 
Hutchinson called for extreme caution in using sperm from the same donor for artificial 
insemination when a child conceived from the sperm is afflicted with an unknown disorder.  Id. at 
759.  
152 Id. at 757-58.  
153 See OTA 1988 Survey, supra note 14, at 9, 33-35, 66-70.   
154 Id. at 9.  
155 Id. at 11, 68. 
156 Id. at 67.  Like Curie-Cohen, the 1988 OTA Survey also found that 49-63% of the 
physicians performing AI would reject a healthy potential donor for having a family history of X-
linked genetic diseases although it would be impossible for such a donor to transmit those defects 
to their offspring.  Id. at 10; see also supra note 147. 
157 See OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 35.  
158 Id.  
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The OTA’s 1988 reports proved to be a benchmark in the calls for the regulation 
of DRT in general, and their screening and testing in particular.159  Later commentators 
have also recognized the importance of genetic screening and testing of DRT donors and 
their evaluation by genetics specialists.160  Ultimately, it was not government authorities 
who rose to the challenge but rather professional organizations, such as the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Association of Tissue 
Banks (AATB).   
2. The ASRM Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation 
The ASRM Guidelines161 set out to “provide the latest recommendations for 
evaluation of potential sperm, oocyte, and embryo donors, incorporating recent 
information about optimal screening and testing for . . . genetic diseases.”162  With 
respect to semen donation, the ASRM Guidelines determine that the “main qualities to 
seek in selecting a donor . . . are an assurance of good health status and the absence of 
genetic abnormalities . . . [and] [t]he donor should be . . . ideally, less than 40 years of 
age;”163 oocyte donors should preferably be between the ages of 21-34.164  The ASRM 
Guidelines specify that potential sperm and egg donors should undergo genetic screening 
                                                
159 See Marwick, supra note 27, at 1339 (describing [then] Senator Albert Gore’s criticism of 
the FDA’s non-regulation of AI in light of the OTA 1988 Survey). 
160 See, e.g., Lisa Kump et al, The Importance of Genetic Screening for Oocyte Donors, 78 
Fertility & Sterility S43, S43 (2002) (describing the genetic screening and testing of 607 
prospective egg donors, which resulted in the exclusion of 71 of them, i.e., more than 12%, and 
concluding that genetic screening of prospective egg donors that included detailed family history 
and testing for a number of diseases should be encouraged “to assure optimal short-term and 
long-term outcomes for pregnancies achieved through . . . donation”); Rubens L.C. Tavares et al., 
The Value of Genetic Screening of Oocyte Donors Couples, 80 Fertility & Sterility S138, S138 
(2003) (reporting that genetic screening of prospective egg donors resulted in the exclusion of 
more than 20% of the prospective donors for such reasons as having sickle cell anemia and 
having prior children with mental retardation); Robert Wallerstein et al., Genetic Screening of 
Prospective Oocyte Donors, 70 Fertility & Sterility 52, 52 (1998) (reporting the exclusion of 
eight out of 73 egg donor candidates (11%) due to “serious genetic findings” and concluding that 
“[a] thorough genetic evaluation, including a history and laboratory [test]ing, is essential to any 
oocyte donation program to maximize positive outcomes”). 
161 See generally The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med. and the 
Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., 2006 Guidelines for Gamete and 
Embryo Donation, 86 Fertility & Sterility S38 (2006) [hereinafter ASRM Guidelines]. 
162 Id. at S38.  
163 Id. at S40 § VI.A.1-2. 
164 If a prospective donor is older than 34, the Guidelines require that the donor’s age be 
revealed to the recipient as part of the informed consent discussion concerning the possible effect 
of donor age on genetic risks.  Id. at S44 § VI.B.3, 5.  
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and testing for heritable diseases, including carrier status for CF in all donors and other 
genetic testing as indicated by the donor’s ethnic background and in light of the family 
history.165  The ASRM Guidelines also set an explicit “minimum” standard for genetic 
screening and testing of DRT donors, according to which donors and their first degree 
relatives (parents, siblings and children) must not have (1) any major Mendelian disorder, 
such as Huntington’s disease;166 (2) any major functional or cosmetic malformation of 
complex cause, such as spina bifida167 or heart malformation;168 or (3) any significant 
familial disease with a major genetic component.169  The ASRM Guidelines further 
require that donors must not carry any known karyotypic abnormality that might result in 
chromosomally unbalanced gametes and that donors should be tested for carrier status of 
CF and genetic disorders for which they are in a high-risk group.170   
3. The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) Standards for Tissue 
Banking 
Like the ASRM Guidelines, the AATB Guidelines171 are meant to “prevent 
disease transmission”172 and preliminarily require compliance with any and all applicable 
                                                
165 See id. at S40 § VI.B.2 (sperm donors); see also id. at S44 §§ VI.B.7, VI.C.1 (egg donors).  
Notably, the ASRM Guidelines clarify that as new tests for genetic risk factors become available, 
“every effort should be made” to have samples of sperm that are cryopreserved tested in 
accordance with the new standards.  Id. at S42 § IV.B.6.d.   
166 Huntington’s disease (HD) results from a genetically programmed degeneration of brain 
cells in certain areas of the brain which causes uncontrolled movements, loss of intellectual 
faculties, and emotional disturbance.  HD is an autosomal dominant disease, which means that if 
a child inherits the HD gene he or she will develop the disease.  Each child of an HD parent has a 
50-50 chance of inheriting the HD gene.  A person who inherits the HD gene will sooner or later 
develop the disease.  See Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Huntington’s Disease 
Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/huntington/huntington.htm (last visited 
May 9, 2010).  
167 Spina bifida (SB) is a disorder involving incomplete development of the brain, spinal cord, 
and/or their protective coverings caused by the failure of the fetus’s spine to close properly during 
the first month of pregnancy.  Infants born with SB sometimes have an open lesion on their spine 
where significant damage to the nerves and spinal cord has occurred.  See Nat’l Inst. of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Spina Bifida Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/spina_bifida/spina_bifida.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).   
168 Notably, the ASRM Guidelines acknowledge that “’major’ is a matter of judgment.”  
ASRM Guidelines, supra note 161, at Appendix A S50.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See generally Am. Ass’n of Tissue Banks, Standards for Tissue Banking (10th ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter AATB Guidelines]. 
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statutory and regulatory standards.173 The AATB Guidelines state that donor suitability 
should be evaluated based upon medical, social and sexual history,174 physical 
examination and laboratory tests.175  The evaluation should include “any history of 
chemical and/or radiation exposure as well as family medical history and genetic 
background;”176 specifically, it should entail an evaluation by a person knowledgeable in 
clinical genetics of at least three generations of the donor’s family history.177  The AATB 
Guidelines set an age limit of forty years for semen donors and thirty-five years for egg 
donors178 and require that “[a]ny condition in a prospective donor or donor’s family 
history that would pose a risk of producing an offspring with a genetic disease or defect 
greater than the risk in the general population shall disqualify him/her as a donor.”179  
The Guidelines further explicitly require that if there is an indication of a risk of Tay-
Sachs disease, thalassemia, sickle cell anemia or CF in the donor’s medical history, 
family history or ethnic background, the donor should be tested for such conditions.180 
Interestingly, although the AATB Guidelines use compulsory language, their sole 
sanction for non-compliance is withdrawal of accreditation “upon a determination . . . 
that significant non-compliance, such as repeated violations, one or more egregious 
violations, uncorrected violations or deliberate falsehoods, have occurred.”181  
                                                                                                                                            
172 Id. at iv.  
173 Id. at 1 § A1.000.  
174 According to the AATB Guidelines, the medical history should be reviewed by a “trained 
individual” and include previous medical records, test results, and conversation with attendant 
medical staff.  Id. § D4.230.  
175 Id. at 31 § D4.100.  
176 Id. at 34 § D4.220.  
177 AATB Guidelines, supra note 171, at 35 § D4.221.   
178 Id. at 45-46 § D4.400.  
179 Id. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at iv-v, 1 § A1.000. 
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4. Contemporary Genetic Screening and Testing Practices of DRT Institutions and 
Adherence to the Professional Guidelines  
Relatively recent studies indicate that not much has changed since the 1980s with 
respect to the genetic screening and testing practices of DRT.182  According to a study 
published in 2007, the four participating DRT institutions tested potential donors for 
blood type, Rh factor, drugs and sexually transmitted infections, gave them psychological 
evaluations and required them to prepare a detailed family health history for three 
generations.183  Yet, none of the DRT institutions had a requirement for any mandatory 
genetic testing and not even all of them had the donors’ medical history evaluated by a 
genetics specialist who, presumably, could have indicated whether further testing was 
necessary.184 
Another survey attempted to determine how the practices of DRT institutions 
which are members of the AATB vary from the AATB Guidelines.185  According to this 
survey, while all sixteen sperm banks that responded186 required prospective donors to 
provide their medical and family history and undergo a physical examination, only 
thirteen (81% of the DRT institutions) tested men of ethnic risk groups for Tay-Sachs 
disease, sickle cell anemia and thalassemia; only four (25%) tested all donors for CF; 
only eight (50%) reported they would test for CF even if there was a positive family 
history of the disease;187  and only six had a genetic professional on staff.188  Amazingly, 
three DRT institutions (19%) rejected prospective sperm donors based on a positive 
family history of color blindness and seven banks (44%) did so with a family history of 
                                                
182 See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Human Tissue Banks: FDA Taking 
Steps to Improve Safety, but some Concerns Remain 14-15 (1997) [hereinafter GAO 1997 
Report] (discussing non-compliance of AATB members with the AATB Guidelines).  
183 Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the 
Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 319, 324, 327-28 (2007) (discussing how 
the social process of bodily commoditization varies based on sex and gender in the context of egg 
and sperm donations). 
184 Id. at 328.  
185 See Conrad, supra note 10, at 298.  
186 Notably, another twenty-one DRT institutions chose not to participate in the survey.  
According to Conrad, those DRT institutions that participated in the survey “were primarily 
large-volume, private, nationally based commercial cryobanks, in contrast to regional cryobanks 
serving a limited population.”  See id. at 299.  Presumably, the non-participating DRT institutions 
were in even poorer compliance with the AATB Guidelines than the participating DRT 
institutions.     
187 See id. at 298.  
188 Id. 
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hemophilia.189  The survey’s conclusion was that “[c]onsiderable differences exist among 
semen bank practices in accordance with guidelines published by national agencies.”190 
A similar survey focusing on the compliance of 159 oocyte donation programs 
with the ASRM Guidelines revealed “considerable variability” in the practices of 
screening and testing for genetic disorders.191  According to this survey, only 72% of the 
oocyte donation programs tested donor candidates from ethnic groups at higher risk for 
sickle cell anemia and only 77% did so with respect to Tay-Sachs disease.192  The survey 
had several even more alarming findings, e.g., that only 62% of the participating 
programs said they would exclude applicants with first-degree relatives who had 
ADPKD.193  In other words, more than a third of the programs that took the survey 
confirmed that they would knowingly expose babies born from eggs originating from 
donors who had a first degree relative with ADPKD to a risk of 25% of developing 
ADPKD.194  The survey’s conclusion was that while most programs followed ASRM 
Guidelines, “a significant minority . . . do[] not use well-established [genetic] . . . 
tests.”195  The findings of the abovementioned surveys are underscored by the fact that 
not all DRT institutions participate in professional accreditation programs, such as those 
of the AATB and ASRM.196   
                                                
189 Id. at 300.  Like hemophilia, color blindness is an X-linked recessive disorder.  As 
explained above, such rejection could have no medical/genetic basis.  See supra note 147.  
190 Conrad, supra note 10, at 300. 
191 Vivian Lewis et al., Survey of Genetic Screening for Oocyte Donors, 71 Fertility & Sterility 
278, 278 (1999).   
192 Id. at 279.  
193 Id. at 280 (Table 1).  Similarly, only 76% of the programs reported they would do so in the 
case of Huntington’s disease.  Id.  For a discussion of Huntington’s disease, see supra note 166.  
194 See supra note 8 (discussing ADPKD).  With only 62% of the programs taking the survey 
confirming that they would exclude applicants with first-degree relatives who had ADPKD, the 
implication is that 38% of the programs would not exclude applicants with first-degree relatives 
who had ADPKD.  This means that these programs would actually include in their DRT donation 
programs individuals with first-degree relatives having ADPKD.  Statistically speaking, this 
would mean that these egg donation programs would knowingly sell eggs from donors having a 
50% chance of having ADPKD themselves.  Since a child has a 50% chance of getting the 
ADPKD gene from a parent having this gene, children born from eggs originating from such 
donors have a 25% chance (50% of 50%) of having the ADPKD gene themselves.  See supra note 
8. 
195 Lewis et al., supra note 191, at 280-81.  
196 For example, out of an estimated 400 or more tissue banks existing in the United States in 
the early 1990s, only forty were inspected and accredited by the AATB.  See Barbara Indech, The 
International Harmonization of Human Tissue Regulation: Regulatory Control Over Human 
Tissue Use and Tissue Banking in Select Countries and the Current State of International 
Harmonization Efforts, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 343, 348 (2000).  In 2003, out of 115 sperm banks 
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Importantly, by 2005 the FDA was aware of the non-uniform compliance of DRT 
institutions with self-imposed professional standards.  According to the FDA Final Donor 
Eligibility Rule, only 80% of the examined institutions providing ART services adhered 
to professional standards and guidelines.197  Moreover, while the FDA estimated that 
compliance of tissue banks with professional standards of donor screening and testing 
neared 100% for several types of tissues, it recognized that “facilities handling 
reproductive tissue [were] the primary exception to this finding” and that most sperm 
banks did not follow voluntary industry standards.198  The FDA also acknowledged that 
only a small percentage of the sperm banks surveyed were members of the AATB and 
followed its Guidelines on screening and testing.199 
In conclusion, despite the existence of professional guidelines setting clear 
requirements for genetic screening and testing of DRT, effective enforcement 
mechanisms and deterring sanctions are lacking.  As such, compliance by DRT 
institutions with such guidelines is varied and depends on the level of commitment of 
each individual DRT institution.  Persistent findings of non-compliance with self-
imposed professional guidelines since the 1990s indicate that this picture of non-uniform 
                                                                                                                                            
nationwide, only 11 were accredited by the AATB.  See Gail Schmoller Philbin, Web of 
Conception; Couples Turning to Internet Sites to Secure Donated Sperm, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 
20, 2003, at C1.  Similarly, the GAO 1997 Report disclosed that only approximately one-third of 
the reproductive laboratories in the United States existing at that time were accredited by the 
ASRM.  See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 10.  The reality of non-participation in 
professional regulation of DRT is easily noticeable upon browsing through internet websites of 
DRT banks:  out of about a dozen internet websites of sperm banks visited by the author, while 
all of the sperm banks boasted the “quality” of their DRT, only one sperm bank clearly indicated 
that the bank is a member of the AATB.  Notably, this fact is a further indication of the low 
enforceability of professional guidelines on DRT institutions.  The fact that many DRT 
institutions are not members of the ASRM and AATB is also an indication that DRT institutions 
might not be concerned that such non-membership would have a detrimental effect on their 
ability to do business, which, in turn, reflects on the ability of the ASRM and AATB to enforce 
their guidelines on those DRT institutions that are members.  In other words, the fact that there 
are, apparently, many DRT institutions that are not even members of or accredited by the AATB 
and ASRM is an indication that non-compliance with the guidelines of such professional 
organizations is of little or no concern to DRT institutions and that the potential implications of 
such non-compliance (if any) carry little (if any) deterrent effect.  
197 The FDA’s survey covered 110 sperm banks and 400 establishments providing ART 
services.  See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 68654.  This data was part of 
the FDA’s reasoning for the need for federal regulation of DRT institutions with respect to 
communicable diseases. 
198 Id. at 29817-18.   
199 Id.   
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compliance is not transitory and is unlikely to change without government 
intervention.200  
E. Why the Current Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue is 
Insufficient and the Need for Additional Protection of DRT Recipients and DRT Children 
1. The Insufficiency of Self-Regulation 
Evidently, and as recognized by fertility professionals and the FDA, self-
regulation is insufficient for ensuring the health and welfare of DRT children and their 
families.201  There is persistent data showing that a significant portion of DRT institutions 
are not even members of the ASRM or AATB.202  Even those establishments that are 
members of ASRM and AATB often do not adhere to the professional guidelines set by 
these organizations,203 and there is significant variance in genetic screening and testing 
                                                
200 See also Conrad, supra note 10, at 301 (pointing out that despite more than a decade (at 
that time) of proposals for genetic screening and testing of DRT, no changes have taken place in 
the practices of DRT institutions).    
201 See also 66 Fed. Reg. 5452 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (expressing the FDA’s view that, in the 
context of communicable diseases, “extending regulation to reproductive cells and tissues will 
remedy a significant gap in oversight.  Although we recognize the value of professional efforts to 
self-regulate, and of regulatory efforts of other agencies and the States, we disagree that these 
piecemeal, often voluntary, efforts are adequate”); Cohen, supra note 23, at 352 (expressing 
doubts regarding the ability of the medical profession to effectively self-regulate the field of 
ART); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 829 (arguing that the lack of established mechanisms to police 
compliance with professional guidelines causes irregular compliance); Jennifer L. Rosato, The 
Children of ART: Should the Law Protect them from Harm?, 57 Utah L. Rev. 57, 62-63 (2004) 
(“Although there is some self-regulation of fertility practices through professional medical 
organizations, the system is not well-equipped to curb harmful or unethical practices.”). 
Notably, some commentators have expressed concerns that the current regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT also fails to recognize and promote the interests and well-being (not only the 
safety) of DRT children and their families as well as those of society as a whole.  See Council on 
Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 195; Erik Parens & Lori Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public 
Policy—Reflections and Recommendations, Hast. Ctr. Rep., July-August 2003, at S3, S7-S9 
(2003). 
202 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.  This non-compliance with self regulation 
requirements was apparently one of the rationales for the FDA’s creation of the Human Tissue 
Regulations.  See also 66 Fed. Reg. 5450 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (“[FDA has] considered the efforts 
of professional organizations and we will continue to do so as we implement the new regulations.  
However, not all [tissue] establishments belong to or are accredited by such groups and voluntary 
programs are not enforceable.”).  
203 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 14-15; ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 
651 (“Despite the existence of voluntary guidelines . . . abuses continue to occur”); Human 
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standards between DRT institutions.204  The resultant risks of this reality are further 
exacerbated by the general vulnerability of DRT recipients.  In particular, many DRT 
recipients do not possess the medical or scientific background necessary to enable them 
to “ask the right questions” or properly evaluate some of the risks involved.205 
Moreover, the current scheme of self-regulation relies primarily on the diligence 
and integrity of practitioners as well as on donors volunteering pertinent information 
about their medical history and that of their families.  However, practitioners operate in a 
highly competitive market that creates strong financial incentives that do not necessarily 
coincide with the best interest of DRT recipients and DRT children.206  Potential donors’ 
answers regarding their medical history and that of their families are also often 
insufficient to properly evaluate the genetic risks they might pose.207  Furthermore, the 
financial benefit to donors accompanied by the absence of a clear legal duty to accurately 
                                                                                                                                            
Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 56 (presentation of Armand M. Karow) (“Perhaps the 
most important problem here is the inability of private groups to compel compliance . . . 
voluntary standards are just that—voluntary.”).  In addition, the enforcement mechanisms of 
professional societies are ineffective and the only penalty for non-compliance is revocation of 
membership.  See Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1704 (“[D]ata suggest the majority of sperm 
banks and egg donor agencies do not follow the established screening protocols . . . Even in 
centers that did report testing, most did not fully follow the guidelines set forth by the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine.”); Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 419, 
430 (2005) (“[T]here are no legal consequences for non-accredited U.S. programs . . . there is 
also ‘no consumer-recognized seal of approval or standard symbol that conveys that any 
minimum standards of quality have been met.’”); Rosato, supra note 201, at 66-67.  
204 See, e.g., The N.Y. State Task Force on Life and the Law, Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy 251 (1998) (“The type of family 
history information that would disqualify a prospective egg donor varies considerably at 
programs in New York State.”); Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1704 (“Current use of genetic 
screening by sperm and egg donor enterprises is best described as inconsistent.”).   
205 See Julie Marquis, Gift of Life, Questions of Liability, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 9, 1997, at 
A1 (describing the Johnson Case and referring to Diane Johnson’s admission that she “didn’t 
even know what to ask”); see also Rosato, supra note 201, at 71 (arguing that future parents tend 
to want to achieve pregnancy as quickly as possible thereby making them more prone to take 
unnecessary risks), Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 13 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 517, 535 (1997) 
(arguing that “consumers” of IVF treatments, are often too emotionally involved to “maintain an 
objective and cautious stance toward the practices of institutions and individuals providing the 
service”). 
206 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 201, at 71-72 (describing the strong incentives fertility 
practitioners have to provide couples with a pregnancy as quickly as possible).  
207 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 37 (disclosing a study conducted by one tissue 
bank which found that 9.8% of 1,000 donors whose families provided a medical history that did 
not indicate genetic risk factors were rejected upon testing or autopsy).  
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disclose such information208 might render the current screening practices—which rely 
mostly on questioning of potential donors—unreliable because they create an incentive 
for potential donors to hide negative medical facts about themselves and their families.209  
As a result, a significant number of the many thousands of children born every year from 
DRT are exposed to a heightened risk of having severe genetic diseases which could have 
been avoided through proper genetic screening.   
2. The Inadequacy of the Relief Afforded by Courts 
One would have expected that once the risks embedded in the current system 
came to bear on a particular child, such individual born from genetically defective DRT 
would be able to obtain appropriate relief in court.  Yet, the few published cases 
pertaining to genetic injuries of children born from DRT raise significant doubts as to the 
adequacy of the court system for providing sufficient and timely remedies to such 
children and their families or to create the deterrent effect needed in order to avoid 
similar future injuries.210  
First, in order to make a viable claim, injured DRT children and their families 
have to trace their maladies back to the acts and omissions of a DRT institution—a legal 
and scientific feat in and of itself.211  Second, as demonstrated by the Johnson and 
Paretta cases, the causes of action available to plaintiffs in such matters are limited212 
and difficult to establish.213  Finally, to the extent that Johnson and Paretta are 
representative of cases involving injuries caused by genetically defective DRT, the 
                                                
208 Only two states explicitly require potential donors to disclose relevant medical information 
fully and accurately.  See supra note 73.  
209 See Curie-Cohen, supra note 143, at 588.  
210 Annas, supra note 22, at 936 (arguing that the courts’ deference to the contractual 
relationship between DRT manufacturers and parent-consumers is inadequate due to its failure to 
acknowledge and protect underlying interests of children, parents and society); Amy Shelf, A 
Need to Know Basis: Record Keeping, Information Access and the Uniform Status of Children of 
Assisted Conception Act, 51 Hastings L.J. 1047, 1067 (2000) (raising doubts as to the sufficiency 
of tort claims to create an incentive for DRT manufacturers to perform genetic testing and 
compile medical records).  
211 See supra Part II.B (discussing this issue); see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.   
212 The current law, at least in California and New York, does not provide injured DRT 
children with effective means of suing for their injuries.  See supra Part II.C; see also Annas, 
supra note 22, at 938 (arguing that the current regulatory framework is a “bad way to protect 
children” because it focuses on “provid[ing] the adults involved with what they want” rather than 
making the children born the first priority).   
213 But see Browne, supra note 96, at 2608-09 (suggesting a different approach to establishing 
liability of DRT manufacturers that would circumvent some of the problems and hardships 
inherent to the current legal framework).  
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settlement amounts in such cases are arguably too low to create a real incentive for DRT 
institutions to improve their genetic screening and testing practices.214   
Even if we ignore the fact that lawsuits impose significant financial burdens that 
not everyone is capable of bearing, judicial remedies are, by definition, case-specific and 
retrospective and, therefore, too late for the genetically injured child and her family; by 
the time of the trial, the child and her family have already experienced pain and suffering 
and will live with the consequences of the genetic injury for the rest of their lives.215  
Additionally, because the genetic risks to DRT children might manifest many years after 
the treatment took place, medical malpractice litigation may not be an effective venue for 
obtaining “real time” quality control.216  
3. DRT Recipients and DRT Children are Entitled to and It Is Desirable that They 
Have Additional Legal Protection 
The Paretta court’s proposition that DRT children’s injuries are not compensable 
where similar injuries of non-DRT children would not be compensable217 is unjustifiable 
and ignores significant differences between the circumstances of conception and 
gestation of DRT and non-DRT children.  First, the conception of DRT children always 
involves a third party—a “middleman”—that normally makes certain representations, 
both direct and implied, to the recipients regarding the DRT, which often create certain 
expectations—reasonable or not—regarding the characteristics of the DRT and future 
                                                
214 Since Johnson and Paretta are the only two reported cases available, it is difficult to make 
an inference from them as to all matters involving injuries resulting from genetically defective 
DRT.  Still, Johnson and Paretta may be indicative of how plaintiffs in such cases perceive their 
chances in court and therefore their leverage in settlement negotiations.  See also Hecht, supra 
note 70, at 258 (“[The] unfavorable trial conditions force plaintiffs to settle for less, while clinics 
are not required to improve the safety of their facilities.”); Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364 
(observing that while settlement amounts in cases involving defective sperm ensure minimal 
compensation, they do little to compel sperm banks and physicians to take action that would 
circumvent similar defects in the future). 
215 See Cohen, supra note 23, at 353 (arguing that the court system does not provide an 
adequate method of regulation in the area of ART, where it is necessary to avert permanent harm 
in advance); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 841 (arguing that litigation is an inadequate enforcement 
mechanism because it is retrospective, deals with injuries of individual parties, results in ad-hoc 
policy limited to case-specific circumstances and generally fails to deter abuses in the AI 
industry); Hodgson, supra note 96, at 364 (observing that once a genetic disease has manifested 
in a child, it is difficult to compensate for the pain and suffering resulting from the injury); Shelf, 
supra note 210, at 1067 (arguing that tort remedies, by nature, are insufficient to recover lost 
genetic and medical information). 
216 See ISLAT Working Group, supra note 2, at 651.  
217 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
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DRT child.218  Second, in assisted reproduction, gametes go through an “in-vitro stage,” a 
period of time in which they are external to the donor and recipient’s body alike.  This 
period of time, even if short, creates a unique opportunity to manipulate the DRT or 
subject it to selection that is meant to achieve favorable results in the future DRT child219 
and which, as before, often creates expectations regarding the future DRT child and her 
genetic makeup.  Thus, the Paretta court was mistaken in its refusal to distinguish 
between assisted and non-assisted reproduction, especially in the context of DRT.220  
Furthermore, the proposition that parents cannot have reasonable expectations that 
their DRT children will not suffer from genetic diseases221 flies in the face of reality as 
DRT recipients often have an underlying—many would say justified—expectation that 
their DRT children would have significantly lower chances of having genetic diseases 
than non-DRT children.222  In fact, many DRT recipients seek to use DRT precisely 
because they wish to avoid the risk of their child having a genetic disease and ensure 
“high quality” genetic traits.223  Thus, denying DRT recipients the assurance of genetic 
                                                
218 The third party is also usually well informed and aware of the medical risks typical to the 
use of DRT.  This makes the representations of the third party—normally a medical 
practitioner—credible and therefore more likely to be relied upon.  Unsurprisingly, it is that “third 
party” that is usually being sued.  Arguably, parties choosing to procreate in a non-assisted 
manner have, at least hypothetically, sufficient opportunity to inform each other and become 
informed with respect to their respective medical condition and genetic makeup.  
219 E.g., manipulation of sperm to select the sex of the future child, picking sperm from a 
donor who resembles the future father to maintain semblance between him and the future DRT 
child and more. 
220 Rather than refuse to distinguish between assisted and non-assisted reproduction, the 
Paretta Court should have determined whether the DRT institution had a duty toward the 
recipients and DRT child based on the particular circumstances of the case and regardless of the 
question of comparability to non-assisted reproduction.  The court should have left the 
comparability question to later cases addressing the issue from the non-assisted reproduction 
perspective, i.e., whether children conceived via unassisted reproduction could receive the same 
type of relief as children conceived via assisted reproduction. 
221 See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.  
222 See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 10, at 39 (“[Future parents seeking to use DRT to achieve a 
pregnancy instead of adopting a child] wanted the opportunity to hand-pick a donor’s genes rather 
than gamble on a birth mother’s and father’s.”); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the 
Era of Genomics, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 439, 460 (2003) (“[U]sing gamete and embryo selection 
technologies to ensure healthy offspring [is] of great importance to individuals.”); Amy Harmon, 
First Comes the Baby Carriage, N.Y. Times Oct. 13, 2005, at G.1 (“You’re paying for it, so you 
kind of want the best of the best.”). 
223 This incentive was acknowledged by the Johnson Court.  See Johnson v. Superior Court 
(Johnson II), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“A wide variety of factors leads 
individuals to their decision to use [AI] including genetic disorders.”); Helen M. Alvare, The 
Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 1, 25 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he industry is in the business of selling superior genetic 
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quality that many of them seek by not affording them appropriate legal remedies when 
they and their DRT children are injured defeats one of the main reasons for using DRT. 
From a torts policy point of view, the current regulatory scheme is contrary to 
notions of justice and economic efficiency.224  As explained above, DRT recipients are 
the least informed and least equipped party to assess the genetic risks involved in the use 
of DRT.  Moreover, under the current regulatory scheme, DRT recipients run the most 
significant risk involved in the use of DRT—giving birth to very sick individuals.  
Meanwhile, DRT institutions that could have prevented the injury most efficiently and 
effectively, and which are also the “deep pocket,” are left practically unscathed.225  This 
situation is not only inefficient from an economic standpoint but also offensive from 
distributive and corrective justice points of view.   
It is prudent to assume that with the persistently high number of individuals using 
DRT, constant improvement in preconception diagnosis technology and the maturation of 
DRT children (and manifestation of dormant genetic diseases), claims of DRT children 
and recipients, which are still relatively rare, will increase in number.226  In other words, 
unless the regulatory framework is changed, the problems stemming from the current 
regulatory scheme are only going to be aggravated.   
In sum, the DRT market, given its particular characteristics, is currently under-
regulated to an extent that poses a significant risk to the lives, health and welfare of a 
large and ever growing population of DRT recipients and DRT children.227  In the several 
decades since ART became available to the public, the federal government, states, courts 
and professional organization have all failed to create a coherent regulatory scheme that 
would protect DRT recipients, DRT children and the public from avoidable genetic 
hazards involved in DRT.228  This type of systemic failure calls for the involvement of 
                                                                                                                                            
inheritances for high fees”); Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 823, 827-28 (“[M]any recipients use 
artificial insemination to avoid passing a genetic disease to their children.”); Peterson, supra note 
69, at 62-63 (asserting that the second most common reason for the use of AI is that the intended 
father carries a genetic mutation which the intended parents fear transmitting to their child).   
224 See Hodgson, supra note 96, at 359 (calling for increased moral accountability and legal 
liability where economizing the results of the creation of “low-cost, low-quality human 
offspring”).  
225 Indeed, the settlement amounts of over $1M in the Johnson and Paretta cases are 
significant.  Yet, they did not include any punitive component and, arguably, were not substantial 
enough to create a deterrent effect.  
226 See Browne, supra note 96, at 2591.  See also Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm 
Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2006, at F5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/health/06opin.html.  
227 See Parens & Knowles, supra note 201, at S12, S14 (arguing that although many groups 
and federal agencies have commented on or asserted authority over DRT, “there is, at best, a 
patchwork system of oversight” which calls for improved government oversight) 
228 Notably, numerous commentators have highlighted the lack of protection of DRT children 
as especially problematic.  See generally Alvare, supra note 223, at 25-26 (arguing that the DRT 
industry accommodates and prefers the interests of adults over the needs and well-being of 
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the federal government.229  As discussed infra in Part IV, the FDA is the federal 
government branch best positioned for and capable of regulating the genetic aspects of 
DRT and has the authority to do so.  By way of comparison, the next section describes 
the federal-like regulation of genetic aspects of DRT in the European Union and 
exemplifies some of its features that may be “imported” to a similar future scheme in the 
United States.  
III. THE REGULATION OF GENETIC ASPECTS OF DONATED REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE IN 
EUROPE 
Given its unique history and circumstances, regulation in the United States 
generally, and that of reproductive technologies in particular, is not comparable to the 
regulation in other countries. However, there is merit in observing how some of the 
problems that plague the regulation of this area in the United States are addressed in 
Europe so that similar solutions may be crafted for the regulation of DRT in the United 
States. 
A. The European Union 
Article 152(4)(a) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community gives the 
European Union (“E.U.”) the mandate to pass laws on the quality and safety of human 
tissues and cells.230  In light of the fact that many DRT recipients acquire their DRT 
through cross-border exchange, the E.U. sought to create uniformity of standards among 
member states so that E.U. citizens would benefit from the same protection as they would 
under the laws of their own country.231  Accordingly, in 2004, the E.U. issued the Tissues 
and Cells Directive, which established rules and principles meant to ensure the safety and 
quality of DRT in E.U. countries.232  The 2004 Directive recognized that  
                                                                                                                                            
children); Rosato, supra note 201, at 62, 69 (noting that “[t]he market rules and no one in the 
entire contracting process speaks for the future child” and “it does not appear that self-regulation 
sufficiently protects children and is unlikely to do so in the near future”).  Some commentators 
reached the same conclusion over a decade ago.  See Ginsberg, supra note 96, at 823-41 (arguing 
that state-by-state regulation, self-imposed guidelines and private adjudication have all proven 
inadequate for regulating the artificial insemination industry and calling for federal regulation of 
the screening and testing of donated sperm).  
229 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (concluding that “it will probably take federal action to 
move children to the center of consideration in the fertility business”).   
230 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community art. 152, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C321) 115, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf.  
231 See Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on Human Tissues and Cells (Feb. 8, 
2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/66. 
232 See Council Directive 2004/23, 2004 O.J. (L102) 48-58 (EC) [hereinafter 2004 Directive].   
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[t]he use of tissues and cells for application in the human body can cause 
diseases and unwanted effects . . . [most of which] can be prevented by 
careful donor evaluation and the testing of each donation in accordance 
with rules established and updated according to the best available 
scientific advice.233   
Accordingly, the 2004 Directive required each member state to establish a system for the 
accreditation of tissue establishments and for notification regarding adverse events linked 
to the testing and distribution of tissue.234  The 2004 Directive further required setting 
donor selection criteria and donor testing requirements and stipulated that member states 
were required to pass appropriate laws and regulations to implement the 2004 Directive 
no later than April 7, 2006.235   
Subsequently, in 2006, the European Commission issued two additional directives 
expanding on the 2004 Directive.  The first directive, 2006/17, covered the collection and 
processing of reproductive tissue.236  Recognizing that “[r]eproductive cells have, due to 
the specific nature of their application, specific quality and safety characteristics,”237 
2006/17 requires that the use of reproductive cells other than for directed donation must 
meet several criteria, including:238  (1) donors must be selected on the basis of their age, 
health and medical history, as determined based on a questionnaire and a personal 
interview performed by healthcare professionals;239 (2) a decision to use any particular 
DRT must be based on an assessment of the risk of transmission of inherited conditions 
known to be present in the donor’s family and genetic testing for autosomal recessive 
genes known to be prevalent in the donor’s ethnic background; and (3) the recipient must 
receive a clear explanation of all of the information about the risks associated with using 
the DRT and the measures undertaken to mitigate them. 
Later in 2006, the European Commission issued another directive, 2006/86, that 
imposed several additional requirements related to the processing of DRT and to the 
traceability and reporting of serious adverse events.240  2006/86 requires tissue 
manufacturers to have procedures in place to retain records of tissues and cells they 
                                                
233 Id. at Whereas 17.  
234 Id. at Whereas 25; arts. 11, 15.  
235 Id. at arts. 28, 31.  
236 See Council Directive 2006/17 2006 O.J. (L38) 40-52 (EC) [hereinafter 2006/17].  
237 Id. at Whereas 4.  
238 Id. at Annex III § 3.  
239 Specifically, the 2006 Directive requires that different sources of information be used to 
obtain the relevant information, including an interview with the donor (mandatory), review of the 
donor’s medical records and their evaluation by a qualified health professional, interview with the 
donor’s treating physician and physical examination of the donor.  Id. at Annex IV § 1.2.  
240 See Council Directive 2006/86 2006 O.J. (L204) 23-36 (EC) [hereinafter 2006/86]. 
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procured and to immediately report to the appropriate authorities and other tissue 
establishments serious adverse conditions in a donor that may reflect on the quality and 
safety of a donated tissue.241  The Directive further stipulates that the records must be 
kept for a period of at least thirty years and that all data be coded in a unified single 
European identification code system.242      
In conclusion, the E.U. adopted a mandatory framework requiring, among other 
things, the genetic screening and testing of DRT donors and reporting adverse events, 
including those suspected as having a genetic background.  I will now discuss 
implementation of the 2004 and 2006 Directives (E.U. Directives) in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.  
B. The United Kingdom 
Even before the European Commission issued the E.U. Directives, matters 
involving DRT were regulated in the United Kingdom under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (HFE Act).243  On May 25, 2007, a new set of regulations went into 
effect that extensively amended and supplemented the HFE Act to comply with the E.U. 
Directives.244  The HFE Regulations included a list of requirements pertaining to the 
procurement and distribution of DRT, operation of a DRT institution and engaging in 
various related activities.  In particular, the HFE Regulations required DRT institutions to 
keep records containing information regarding the quality and safety of gametes and 
embryos and any information necessary to trace gametes and embryos back to their 
donors.245  The HFE Regulations further required that the British Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) investigate serious adverse events related to DRT and 
fertilization and communicate to the European Commission and parallel authorities in 
other member states relevant information which may assist in withdrawal of 
compromised DRT.246 
Most importantly, with respect to donations of gametes or embryos other than 
between partners, the HFE Regulations stipulate that DRT institutions must comply with 
the selection criteria for donors and the requirements for laboratory tests set forth in 
Section 3 of Annex III of 2006/17.247  Specifically, the HFE Regulations require the 
                                                
241 Id. at art. 5, Annex VI.  
242 Id. at arts. 9-10.  
243 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 
244 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Quality and Safety) Regulations, 2007, S.I. 
2007/1522 (U.K.) [hereinafter HFE Regulations].  
245 Id. at § 13.  
246 Id. at §§ 10, 18.  
247 Id. at § 30, Annex 3A § 7.  
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selection of donors on the basis of their age, health and medical history and an 
assessment of the risk of transmission of inherited conditions known to be present in the 
donor’s family as well as genetic testing for autosomal recessive genes known to be 
prevalent in the donor’s ethnic background.248  In other words, in order to receive a 
license under the HFE Act, a DRT institution must have in place an appropriate 
framework for the minimization of the genetic risks to DRT children.  
In addition, the HFEA has published a Code of Practice that expands upon and 
clarifies the requirements set forth in the amendments to the HFE Act.249   According to 
the HFEA Code, DRT institutions must not collect sperm from donors older than forty-
six or harvest ova from donors older than thirty-six250 and should not use DRT from any 
specific donor in more than ten families.251  The HFEA Code requires DRT institutions to 
take donors’ family medical histories and test donors as necessary based on the risk 
factors identified.252  The HFEA Code further directs DRT institutions to follow 
contemporary professional guidance of relevant professional bodies on the genetic tests 
and screening techniques they should implement.253  In particular, the HFEA Code 
mentions the guidelines of the British Andrology Society and the British Fertility 
Society.254   
                                                
248 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.  Notably, an additional requirement is that the 
recipient must receive a clear explanation of complete information on the genetic risks associated 
with the gametes received and on the measures undertaken for their mitigation. 
249 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Code of Practice (7th ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter HFEA Code], available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Seventh_Edition__R3.pdf.  
250 Id. at §§ G.4.2.1-G.4.2.2.  
251 Id. at § G.4.6.1. 
252 Id. at §§ G.4.7.1-G.4.7.2.   
253 Id. at § G.4.9.1.   
254 Id.  See also Ass’n of Biomedical Andrologists et al., UK Guidelines for the Medical and 
Laboratory Screening of Sperm, Egg and Embryo Donors, 11 Human Fertility 201, 201 (2008) 
[hereinafter British Professional Guidelines].  The British Professional Guidelines set forth an 
extensive list of tests that DRT institutions and practitioners should perform and instructions to be 
followed as part of the donor screening and selection procedures.  Importantly, the British 
Professional Guidelines stipulate that when taking medical histories of potential donors, inquiries 
should be made to ensure that the donor does not have “familial disease with a major genetic 
component . . . any significant Mendelian disorders, such as (but not exclusively) albinism, 
hemophilia, hemoglobin disorders,” “familial disease with a known or reliably indicated major 
genetic component, such as debilitating asthma, juvenile diabetes mellitus, epileptic disorder,” “a 
chromosomal rearrangement that may result in unbalanced gametes,” and more.  Id. at 203.  The 
British Professional Guidelines further instruct that “the potential donor should ordinarily not be 
heterozygous for an autosomal recessive gene for a disease known to be prevalent in the donor’s 
ethnic background, e.g., CF in Caucasian populations, α0 or β-Thalassemia in Mediterranean 
populations, sickle cell disease in African & Afro-Caribbean populations and Tay-Sachs disease 
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Finally, the HFEA Code imposes duties on DRT institutions to notify the 
appropriate authorities, other institutions and recipients once they discover “that a gamete 
donor has a previously unsuspected genetic disease or is the carrier of a deleterious 
recessively inherited condition.”255 
C. Ireland 
As a member state in the European Union, Ireland was also required to 
incorporate the E.U. Directives into its legislation and did so with two sets of regulations 
promulgated by the Irish Minister for Health and Children and administered by the Irish 
Medicine’s Board (IMB).256  Under S.I. No. 158, in order to be licensed to engage in the 
collection and distribution of DRT, institutions must comply with numerous donor 
selection and testing requirements.257  S.I. No. 158 stipulates that donors must be selected 
on the basis of their age, health and medical history, which the donor should provide on a 
questionnaire and in a personal interview by a healthcare professional.258  S.I. No. 158 
further requires the “[g]enetic [test]ing for autosomal recessive genes known to be 
prevalent . . . in the donor’s ethnic background and an assessment of the risk of 
transmission of inherited conditions known to be present in the family” and stipulates that 
“[c]omplete information on the associated risk and on the measure undertaken for its 
                                                                                                                                            
in Jews of Eastern European descent.  The British Professional Guidelines also dictate that 
inquiries should be made to verify that the potential donor’s genetic parents, siblings and 
offspring are free of (1) major malformations listed in the British Professional Guidelines, (2) 
non-trivial disorders showing Mendelian inheritance e.g., autosomal dominant disorders, such as 
Huntington’s disease and  autosomal recessive diseases, particularly if such diseases have a high 
frequency in the population such as CF, (3) a chromosomal abnormality (unless the donor has a 
normal karyotype) and (4) in egg and embryo donors, a history of any mitochondrial disorders.  If 
there is any evidence of any of the above, the British Professional Guidelines instruct that a 
qualified clinical geneticist should evaluate the risk.  Id.  The British Professional Guidelines also 
require that “[a]ll donors should undergo appropriate genetic/cytogenetic testing” which includes 
karyotyping of all donors, and testing according to ethnic background for α0 or β-Thalassemia, 
sickle-cell disease, Tay-Sachs disease and common mutations of CF.  Id. at 204. 
255 HFEA Code, supra note 249, at § G.4.10.5. 
256 See European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Tissues and Cells) Regulations 
2006 (S.I. No. 158 of 2006) (Ir.) [hereinafter S.I. No. 158], available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2006/en/si/0158.html (implementing 2004/23 and 2006/17); 
European Communities (Human Tissues and Cells Traceability Requirements, Notification of 
Serious Adverse Reactions and Events and Certain Technical Requirements) Regulations 2007 
(S.I. No. 598 of 2007) (Ir.) [hereinafter S.I. No. 598] available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2007/en/si/0598.html (implementing 2006/86). 
257 S.I. No. 158 at §§ 5-6, 11(2), 11(6).  
258 Id. at Schedule 3, § 3.1. 
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mitigation must be communicated and clearly explained to the recipient.”259  S.I. No. 598 
supplements the regulatory framework created in S.I. No. 158 by imposing traceability 
and adverse events reporting requirements as directed by 2006/86.260  
The European model of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT could be 
characterized as relying on three premises.  First and foremost, the recognition that 
“while those seeking assisted reproductive treatment deserve and can expect proper 
consideration of their medical and social needs, licensed treatments may result in children 
who would not otherwise have been born and whose interest must be taken into 
account.”261  Second, the structure of the European regulations reflects the recognition 
that the protection of DRT children (and their families) requires the uniformity and 
authoritativeness that can only be afforded by legislation and regulation.  And third, the 
European regulatory framework, while setting general principles and requirements, 
leaves the actual “nuts and bolts” to be decided by professionals who have the necessary 
technical knowledge and expertise; in this respect, state authorities serve as a facilitator 
and enforcer of professional standards. 
An additional advantage of the European model of regulation is that it enables 
state authorities to defer possible bioethical issues to professionals who, by virtue of their 
expertise and involvement in the regulated area, are best equipped to tackle such 
issues.262  The “importation” of professional standards into the regulatory framework 
enables state authorities to avoid having to spend the time and money necessary for 
tackling bioethical issues as well as possible political strife (which administrative entities 
are loathe to provoke) involved with delving into bioethical debates.263 
Despite the particularities of the United States legal system, the three 
abovementioned premises of the European regulation of genetic aspects of DRT can be 
adapted into a feasible model for federal regulation in the United States’ in a fashion that 
would resolve many of the problems that characterize the current regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT.   
IV. TOWARDS FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE GENETIC ASPECTS OF DONATED 
REPRODUCTIVE TISSUE—THE CASE FOR FDA REGULATION 
The first and most important advantage of federal regulation of genetic aspects of 
DRT would be the institution of a uniform and feasibly enforceable standard of conduct 
that would increase adherence of DRT institutions to testing standards thereby promoting 
safety for DRT children regardless of the origin of the DRT from which they were 
                                                
259 Id. at Schedule 3, § 3.6.  
260 See S.I. No. 598 at §§ 5-22.  
261 HFEA Code, supra note 249, at § 1.2.  
262 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.4.  
263 Notably, this approach may be especially fitting to the United States, where disagreements 
on bioethical issues often run deep. 
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conceived.264  In other words, the main function of federal regulation of the genetic 
aspects of DRT would lie in its general applicability.  Assuming that most DRT 
institutions and practitioners would do their best to conform to such standards, the safety 
of using DRT from a genetic standpoint could increase dramatically.265   
Second, the high enforceability of federal regulations266 and adherence to them 
would serve to preempt many occurrences of transmission of genetic diseases to DRT 
children in the first place, thereby providing an ex ante solution to avoid cases like 
Johnson and Paretta.   
Third, the imposition of a federal standard of conduct would diminish the need for 
injured DRT children and their families to resort to ex post solutions. Third, the 
imposition of a federal standard of conduct would, at the very least, strengthen the legal 
stances of DRT children and their families.  A standard set by federal regulations may be 
accepted by courts as the standard of conduct by which the actions of DRT professionals 
should be evaluated when a negligence claim is brought, thereby enabling a quick and 
efficient resolution of such matters.267  Federal standards of conduct set by federal 
                                                
264 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“it will probably take federal action to move children to 
the center of consideration in the infertility business”); Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 
104, at 46-47, 56 (“Unfortunately for those of us in the semen banking business we don’t 
necessarily know which states have [put regulations in place]. . . I would highly support the FDA 
in regulating semen banking;” “FDA standard seems far more likely to prevent state variances 
than voluntary standards.”). 
265 Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 56 (“[A]nother advantage of government 
standards is their ability to reassure the public . . . FDA’s involvement would moot [the] concern 
[that voluntary standards and adherence to them are lacking.]”).  Federal regulation of genetic 
aspects of DRT would also serve to assure consumers in every state and U.S. territory that the 
DRT they acquire is indeed safe without them having to become experts in clinical genetics.   
The need for a generally applicable regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT is further 
highlighted by the lack of such applicability of state regulation.  Since many DRT recipients order 
their DRT from states other than those in which they live, even the few states that do seek to 
regulate the genetic aspects of DRT are likely to find the enforcement of such regulation difficult, 
if not impossible.  It would be impractical and unrealistic to expect that New York State, for 
example, would verify that every semen specimen sent via overnight delivery to consumers 
within its borders was processed, screened and tested in accordance with the New York 
Regulations. 
266 It is preferable that—like the Human Tissue Regulations—federal regulations pertaining to 
the genetic aspects of DRT be enforced by the FDA.   
267 Since the Human Tissue Regulations only address the communicable diseases aspects of 
DRT, DRT institutions sued for negligence in their genetic screening and testing of DRT donors 
could raise a regulatory compliance defense arguing that they are in full compliance with the 
federal standard of practice with respect to the genetic screening and testing of DRT and therefore 
cannot be held liable for incompliance with higher standards set by the states.  Similarly, DRT 
institutions could raise federal preemption arguments seeking to preempt such heightened state 
standards in view of the non-existent federal standard of practice with respect to the genetic 
aspects of DRT.  For a discussion of regulatory compliance and federal preemption defenses, see 
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regulations could also serve to preempt outright refusal by courts to recognize the 
existence of additional causes of action available to DRT recipients, as was done by the 
Paretta court.268  Finally, the imposition of duties as part of federal regulation may 
potentially provide plaintiffs with additional causes of action for breach of statutory duty, 
which may further assist in securing appropriate relief for genetically injured DRT 
children and their families.269   
The FDA is the natural and most promising candidate for carrying out and 
enforcing federal regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.  As discussed above, the FDA 
has been involved in regulation of donated tissues since the late 1990s and DRT since 
2001.  It is prudent to assume that the FDA has acquired much of the technical expertise 
and understanding of the DRT market necessary to also regulate the genetic aspects of 
DRT in an effective and efficient manner.  Thus, it would be desirable to utilize the 
FDA’s acquired expertise as well as its proven abilities in enforcing the Human Tissue 
Regulations270 in the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.271  
The idea of having the federal government, and specifically the FDA, regulate the 
genetic aspects of DRT is not a new one and has been raised time and again, at least since 
1988.272  And yet, in promulgating its relatively recent Human Tissue Regulations, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009); Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance 
Reconsidered, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (2008).  A discussion of federal preemption is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  A comprehensive federal regulatory standard of practice could 
prevent DRT institutions from avoiding liability by raising these defenses.  See also supra note 
101 and accompanying text.  
268 See supra notes 134 and 136 and accompanying text.  
269 For additional possible advantages of setting uniform regulatory standards for DRT see 
Human Tissue and Organs, supra note 104, at 53-54.   
270 See, e.g., HTTF Report, supra note 67 (discussing the FDA’s enforcement of the Human 
Tissue Regulations).  
271 In this respect, due to the rapidly changing and technically complicated nature of the area 
of genetic medicine and ART, the FDA would also be better suited than Congress to address 
issues as they arise.  See Alvare, supra note 223, at 32 (“The size and scope of the legislative 
project—even the definition of individual and the social dilemmas to be approached—may appear 
too large and too rapidly changing a target for legislatures.”).  The regulation of genetic aspects of 
DRT may coincide with the FDA’s own perception of its mission with relation to the regulation 
of human tissue.  See Zoon Statement, supra note 59, at 88-89, 101 (“FDA has prioritized the 
regulation of human cellular and tissue-based products, and the public should be confident that 
the FDA is committed to regulating these products in a manner where benefits to patients are 
maximized and risks to patients are minimized;” “FDA’s goals are to protect the public from 
unsafe tissue products.”).  
272 See GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 3-4, 31 (“FDA should also add to its oversight 
plans provisions that would require . . . disclosure of genetic tests that have been performed on 
donated reproductive tissues.”); Annas, supra note 22, at 935; Marwick, supra note 27, at 1340 
(describing [then] Senator Gore’s call for FDA regulation of DRT, including its genetic aspects, 
to ensure the safety and welfare of DRT children).  
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FDA sought only to regulate the communicable diseases aspects of DRT.273  Notably, the 
FDA did not address the genetic aspects of DRT at any point in the process of 
promulgating the Human Tissue Regulations and the issue never arose in any of the 
abundant public commentary on the proposed FDA regulations.274   
It is highly unlikely that the FDA was unaware of the genetic aspects of DRT in 
2005 when it issued the Final Donor Eligibility Rule.275  In fact, at the time it 
promulgated the Final Donor Eligibility Rule, the FDA was aware of professional 
guidelines that specifically addressed the genetic aspects of DRT276 and probably had 
knowledge of good reasons for regulating the genetic aspects of DRT.277  It therefore 
appears that the absence of genetic aspects of DRT from the Human Tissue Regulations 
was not the result of an oversight but rather intentional avoidance of this area by the 
FDA.   
                                                
273 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
274 It is likely that since, from the outset, the FDA defined the Human Tissue Regulations as 
directed exclusively to the communicable diseases aspects of DRT, it chose not to make public 
any comments it may have received that were related to the genetic aspects of DRT as, 
purportedly, irrelevant to the Human Tissue Regulations.  It is also possible that the FDA has 
made it so abundantly clear that the Human Tissue Regulations, by definition, were only meant to 
address communicable diseases aspects of human tissue, that commentators refrained from 
addressing the genetic aspects of DRT.  See infra Part IV.A. 
275 See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.   
276 For example, in 2004, the ASRM issued an updated version of its Guidelines, which the 
FDA referred to during the process of making the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule.  See 69 Fed. 
Reg. 29819 (FDA May 25, 2004) (“Although ASRM has published guidelines for donor 
screening and testing and other aspects of oocyte donation . . . .”).  
277 Among the rationales for regulation mentioned in the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule 
was concern for  public health that is equally applicable to genetic and communicable diseases 
aspects of DRT:  
Certain diseases are transmissible through the implantation, transplantation, infusion or 
transfer of [donated tissue] . . . To prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of such 
diseases, we consider it necessary to take appropriate measures to prevent the use of cells or 
tissue from infected donors.  Thus, these regulations require that, before the use of most [donated 
tissues], the cell or tissue donor must be determined to be eligible to donate, based on the results 
of screening and testing for relevant . . . diseases.  In most cases, a donor who . . . possesses 
clinical evidence of or risk factors for such a disease, would be considered ineligible, and cells 
and tissues from that donor would not ordinarily be used.  
See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 29787.  
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   291 
A. The FDA’s Statutory Authority to Regulate the Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
There are several possible explanations for the FDA’s failure to regulate the 
genetic aspects of DRT, the first of which is possible doubts regarding its legal authority 
to do so.  As mentioned earlier, in promulgating the Human Tissue Regulations, the FDA 
relied on PHSA § 361, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:278  
Regulations to control communicable diseases 
(a) Promulgation and enforcement by Surgeon General[279]  
The Surgeon General . . . is authorized to make and enforce such 
regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries 
into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any 
other State or possession.  For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such 
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such inspection . . . 
destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated 
as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other 
measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.  
Arguably, PHSA § 361 grants only the authority to promulgate regulations 
pertaining to the prevention of the transmission and spread of infectious diseases rather 
than genetic diseases.280  Under this construction of “communicable diseases,” PHSA § 
                                                
278 PHSA § 361 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264).  
279 As mentioned earlier, the authority under PHSA § 361 was delegated to the FDA.  See 
supra note 62.  
280 This reading of PHSA § 361 relies on a construction of the definition of “communicable 
diseases” as only reasonably including diseases caused by infectious agents rather than by 
chromosomes and genes.  The term “communicable diseases” is not defined in the PHSA.  
However, 21 C.F.R. § 1240.3(b) defines “communicable diseases” as “[i]llnesses due to 
infectious agents or their toxic products, which may be transmitted from a reservoir to a 
susceptible host either directly as from an infected person or animal or indirectly through the 
agency of an intermediate plant or animal host, vector, or the inanimate environment.”  Notably, 
this restrictive definition was created pursuant to the legislation of PHSA § 361 and is in accord 
with its legislative history, which only sought to address infectious diseases as these are defined 
by the FDA.  Yet, under a liberal view on the duties and authorities of executive agencies, should 
the FDA ever choose to change its definition of “communicable diseases” to include genetic 
diseases, it may, arguably, be able to do so, subject the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(5), 553.  Moreover, it is not clear how scientifically sound 
the 42 U.S.C. § 361 dichotomy between communicable and genetic diseases is and whether it is 
justifiable from a public health policy perspective.  For example, many diseases could be branded 
as both infectious and genetic (e.g., HIV, cervical cancer caused by a viral infection).  
Nonetheless, for purposes of the discussion herein, the term “communicable diseases” is 
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361 could not serve as a source of authority to regulate genetic aspects of DRT.  Such 
authority, however, exists elsewhere.   
Among the several other possible routes for regulation of genetic aspects of DRT 
suggested in the past,281 the most promising source of authority is PHSA § 351,282 which 
reads, in relevant part, as follows:283  
 
Regulation of biological products 
(a) Biologics license 
(1) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any biological product unless—  
(A) a biologics license is in effect for the biological 
product  
. . .  
(2) (A) The Secretary shall establish, by regulation, 
requirements for the approval, suspension, and revocation of 
biologics licenses.  
. . .  
(C) The Secretary shall approve a biologics license 
application— 
(i) on the basis of a demonstration that—  
(I) the biological product that is the subject 
of the application is safe, pure, and potent; 
and  
. . .  
(3) The Secretary shall prescribe requirements under which a 
biological product undergoing investigation shall be exempt 
from the requirements of paragraph (1).  
. . . 
 
(i) Definition; application 
In this section, the term “biological product” means a virus, therapeutic 
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, 
allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 
(emphasis added) 
                                                                                                                                            
construed as exclusive of diseases having genetic background (but not diseases resulting from 
viral infections). 
281 See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 96, at 360-85 (advocating treating the sale of sperm as a 
“sale” rather than as a “service” under the U.C.C.); Parens & Knowles, supra note 201, at S19 
(calling for the creation of an HFEA-like body in the United States which would license 
institutions participating in ART related activities).  
282 See Human Tissue and Organs, supra note 104, at 14, 19, 21-22; Peterson, supra note 69, 
at 88.    
283 PHSA § 351 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2007)).  
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The FDA construes the PHSA § 351(i) definition of “biological product” as 
follows:284  
Biological products include a wide range of products such as . . .  somatic 
cells . . . [and] tissues. . . .  Biologics . . . may be living entities such as 
cells and tissues.  Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources - 
human, animal, or microorganism . . . . 
Thus, according to the FDA, “biological products” include human cells and 
tissues.285  PHSA § 351(i) also clarifies that biological products do not necessarily have 
to be used as cures for diseases but could serve for the treatment of a condition of a 
human being.  Arguably, even if infertility cannot be categorized as a disease in the 
conventional sense,286 it could still fall within the boundaries of a “condition of a human 
being” which could be “prevented” or “treated” via the use of DRT.287  Thus, the PHSA § 
351(i) definition of “biological product” could conceivably encompass DRT such that 
PHSA § 351 would give the FDA authority to regulate DRT as a biological product.288 
Admittedly, it is possible to imagine several scenarios where the use of DRT does 
not fall within the PHSA § 351(i) definition of biologics.  For example, it is difficult to 
classify as “treatment” the use of donated sperm to impregnate a perfectly fertile woman 
whose husband suffers from infertility.289  Similarly, it is difficult to classify as 
                                                
284 See FDA, What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited May 10, 
2010).   
285 Although the FDA’s definition only specifically mentions somatic cells, it does not exclude 
reproductive cells and the denominator “such as” indicates that somatic cells are only mentioned 
as an example.  Thus, it appears that reproductive cells could also be biological products under 
the FDA definition.  
286 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 70, at 37.  
287 See Peterson, supra note 69, at 88 (“[T]he phrase ‘analogous product’ easily could be 
interpreted to include semen samples . . . . The straws containing the frozen semen derivative 
could easily be categorized as a ‘biological product’ which is applicable to the ‘treatment or cure’ 
of human infertility diseases.”).   
288 Interestingly, this also appears to have been the opinion of the FDA’s General Counsel in 
1973.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 5 (presentation of Stuart Nightingale, 
Associate Comm’r for Health Affairs, FDA); Merrill, supra note 23, at 9 (presenting the response 
of the Chief Counsel: “Human tissues . . . could be considered ‘analogous’ to materials such as 
blood, over which FDA had authority under section 351”).  Similar positions were presented by 
Paul Parkman, the Director of CBER in 2001.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, 
at 22.  
289 The reason for this is that the person who is actually being “treated” (i.e., the female) is not 
the one actually suffering from infertility. 
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“treatment” the use of DRT due to a couple’s wish to avoid passing along a genetic 
condition existing in one of them.290  Even more significantly, it would be difficult and 
even disturbing to classify the use of sperm by single women or of DRT by single-sex 
couples as a “cure” or “treatment.”  Yet, there are obviously many situations in which the 
use of DRT would fall neatly within the boundaries of PHSA § 351(i) and which ought to 
be “sufficient,” from a regulatory perspective, to deem DRT suitable for regulation under 
PHSA § 351.291 
Furthermore, broad construction of the term “condition of human beings” could 
conceivably encompass almost any scenario involving the use of DRT and it does not 
have to be construed as relating to a medical condition but rather as relating to a social or 
familial situation or even status, e.g., infertility (as a couple or family), childlessness or 
the inability to have children on one’s own or with one’s chosen partner.  In view of the 
above, it is highly unlikely that courts would reject a construction of PHSA § 351(i) that 
would encompass reproductive tissue within the definition of biological products thereby 
facilitating the application of this section to DRT.292   
                                                
290 The reason is that it is not the genetic condition that is being treated.  Rather, the 
underlying reason for using DRT is the couple’s reproductive preferences. 
291 Examples of scenarios that fit into the PHSA § 351(i) framework would include the use of 
donated eggs to enable women who no longer ovulate to conceive, in which case the donated 
eggs could be perceived as “treatment” for such women’s “condition” of infertility; using donated 
sperm in tandem with IVF treatments, in which case the donated sperm is the “treatment” for the 
husband’s inability to provide sperm to fertilize the eggs in order to create embryos that would be 
implanted into his female partner or into a surrogate. 
292 It is well accepted that agencies have discretion to interpret their statutory authorities to 
enable their application in new ways to meet new challenges unforeseen by Congress and that 
they are expected to do so.  See infra note 297 and accompanying text.  Accordingly, although 
Congress might not have envisioned the use of PHSA § 351 for regulating DRT when it enacted 
the section, it is well within the power of the FDA to apply this section to such an end so long as 
its construction of the statutory language meets the Chevron standard.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (“We have long recognized that 
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory 
scheme . . . .”).  Under what came to be called the “Chevron Doctrine,” courts generally grant 
agencies’ discretionary decisions and actions a great measure of deference and are not easily 
persuaded to set them aside so long as (1) “Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue,” and (2) “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”  See id. at 842-44.  According to the Supreme Court, if both conditions are met, then the 
agency’s construction of the statute it is entrusted to administer should receive “considerable 
weight” and “the principle of deference to administrative interpretations [should be] followed.”  
Id.  Given the plausibility of viewing DRT as biological products under at least some 
circumstances that fall neatly within the boundaries of PHSA § 351(i) and the fact that PHSA § 
351 does not address reproductive tissue in general or DRT in particular, it is likely that courts 
would accept an agency’s construction of PHSA § 351(i) as inclusive of DRT.  Notably, this 
entire regulatory conundrum could be resolved if Congress were to amend PHSA § 351(i) so it 
explicitly included reproductive tissue, thereby also indicating that DRT should be 
comprehensively regulated by the FDA. 
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Despite possible concerns that if DRT were to be regulated as a biological product 
every sperm sample would require its own separate approval and licensure, PHSA § 
351(a)(3) provides the FDA with the authority to exempt a biological product from the 
licensure requirements of PHSA § 351(a)(1).  Thus, when promulgating a regulatory 
framework that would address genetic aspects of DRT, the FDA could conceivably 
stipulate, for example, that DRT coming from a donor who was properly screened and 
tested in accordance with regulations promulgated under PHSA § 351(a)(2) would be 
exempt (under PHSA § 351(a)(3)) from the burdensome licensure requirements of PHSA 
§ 351(a)(1).   
PHSA § 351 also provides the FDA with effective enforcement tools that include 
(1) the authority to inspect DRT institutions engaging in collection, processing or 
distribution of DRT293 and (2) the authority to determine whether DRT originating from a 
specific donor would present an imminent or substantial hazard to public health and to 
issue orders for the recall of such DRT.294  Furthermore, in addition to any deterrents and 
incentives the FDA may include in regulations promulgated under PHSA § 351 to ensure 
effective enforcement of the regulation of biologics, violation of PHSA § 351 is a 
criminal offense, punishable by fines and up to one year in prison; it also sets a civil 
penalty of up to $100,000 per day for non-compliance with an order recalling a biological 
product.295  Thus, PHSA endows the FDA with ample authority and sufficient 
enforcement tools to effectively regulate the genetic aspects of DRT. 
B. Other Possible Reasons for the FDA’s Non-Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
1. Lack of Authority to Tend to the Safety of Future People 
Under a narrow construction of the FDA’s authority under PHSA § 351, the 
FDA’s power is arguably limited only to the assurance of the safety of DRT recipients 
rather than that of DRT children.296  Such a reading of FDA authority appears to be 
unnecessarily and unjustifiably narrow, especially in light of the conventional 
understanding that agencies have discretion and are expected to interpret their statutory 
authority so it applies in new ways to meet new challenges that Congress did not 
                                                
293 42 U.S.C. § 262(c) (2007) (granting the FDA authority to inspect any establishments 
engaging in the propagation or manufacture and preparation of any biological product).  
294 Id. at § (d)(1).  
295 Id. at §§ (d)(2), (f). 
296 See, e.g., Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 177 (arguing that the FDA has no 
explicit legal authority to regulate on grounds of protection of a child resulting from ART as 
such).  
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foresee.297  Looking specifically at PHSA § 351, nothing in its language suggests that the 
FDA’s mandate to ensure the safety and efficacy of biologics is limited only to DRT 
recipients or even just to “currently existing people.”  Moreover, there are examples of 
cases where the FDA asserted its regulatory authority over matters involving “future 
individuals,” i.e. individuals not yet in existence when the treatment is carried out or the 
drug is administered.  One prominent example is the FDA’s prohibition on tests involving 
human cloning out of concern for the health of the future children that might be created 
by such a procedure.298  Furthermore, arguably at least in relation to the regulation of 
small molecule drugs (rather than biologics), in authorizing the FDA to require safety 
data analysis in relation to pregnant women, Congress granted the FDA the authority to 
tend to the safety of unborn children.299  At the very least, the abovementioned precedents 
indicate that it is not unreasonable for the FDA to construe its authority under PHSA § 
351 broadly enough to encompass a role for itself in ensuring the safety of future 
individuals, including DRT children.  Therefore, if the FDA were to construe its authority 
under PHSA § 351 as including the safety of DRT children, a court would most likely 
uphold that statutory construction under the Chevron doctrine.300   
2. Lack of Authority to Regulate in the Area of Genetic Aspects of DRT 
The issue of the FDA’s authority to regulate the genetic aspects of DRT comes up 
also in a federal context as part of the question of the Federal Government’s authority to 
                                                
297 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 1 (“It is conventional wisdom that regulatory agencies 
possess discretion to interpret their program statutes in new ways in order to meet challenges that 
the congressional authors did not, and in many cases could not, anticipate . . . we have come to 
expect that agencies will often confront new challenges by adapting traditional tools, rather than 
reflexively returning to the legislature for new authority or instructions.”).  
298 For the FDA’s controversial assertion of authority over human cloning due to concerns for 
the health and safety of individuals resulting from cloning procedures, see Letter from Stuart L. 
Nightingale, M.D., Associate Comm’r, FDA, to Inst. Review Boards 1 (Oct. 26, 1998), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/ucm150508.htm.  
Another controversial example is the FDA’s exceptional regulation of the drug thalidomide, 
known for its potential to cause severe birth defects out of concern for the unborn children. See 
generally Allen E. White, Thalidomide and the FDA: Authority Overstepped or Legitimate Safety 
Measures? (December 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=294563.   
299 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(iv)(I) (2009).  
300 See supra note 292 (discussing the Chevron doctrine).  Congress has clearly not addressed 
the matter of genetic aspects of DRT in PHSA and thus the question becomes whether a 
construction of PHSA that would require screening and testing of DRT donors for genetic 
diseases to ensure the safety of DRT children is a permissible construction of PHSA § 351.  As 
argued above, such a construction is not only reasonable but also desirable.  Assuming that courts 
would not find this view fundamentally inconsistent with the statutory language, they should 
uphold a construction of PHSA § 351 that would grant the FDA authority to regulate the genetic 
aspects of DRT.  
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regulate in the field of healthcare.  DRT transactions routinely occur across state borders 
as well as over the Internet.301  Accordingly, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
provides the FDA, via congressional delegation, the authority to regulate DRT.302  
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the federal power to regulate DRT also extends to 
intrastate commerce in DRT.303  Thus, the FDA has the authority under PHSA § 351 to 
regulate genetic aspects of DRT so long as traditional state regulatory prerogatives are 
not impermissibly impinged upon.  
While the practice of medicine has traditionally been regulated by the states,304 
the Supreme Court has recognized the ability of the federal government to set uniform 
national standards for health and safety.305  Thus, to the extent that FDA regulation of the 
                                                
301 See Gail Schmoller Philbin, Web of Conception; Couples Turning to Internet Sites to 
Secure Donated Sperm, Chicago Trib., Aug 20, 2003 at 1 (“While the Web has transformed the 
way couples . . . find donor sperm, it has also changed the way sperm banks do business.”); Don 
Oldenburg, Sperm Banks Online: Going Too Far? Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4.  See also 
OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 24 (“Sperm [is] sold by commercial sperm banks 
throughout the United States and [has] been for many years.”).  In the absence of exact DRT 
sales’ statistics it is difficult to estimate the volume of interstate transactions in DRT and their 
percentage out of the total number of DRT transactions.  However, it appears prudent to assume 
that a large portion of the DRT transactions occurring over the internet are not confined to within 
a single state’s borders.  The prevalence of the use of the internet as well as several advantages 
the internet offers to DRT purchasers (e.g., privacy, a large selection of potential donors, ease of 
access), all increase the prevalence of the internet in DRT transactions, thereby presumably 
increasing the quantity of interstate DRT transactions both in general and as compared to 
intrastate DRT transactions.     
302 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also OTA’s Infertility Report, supra note 27, at 181-82 
(discussing the use of the Commerce Clause to regulate in other fields of health care and medical 
laboratories). 
303 At least on one occasion, a federal court upheld an FDA ban on intrastate commerce based 
on authority granted by PHSA § 361, recognizing that such a ban was reasonable to prevent the 
interstate spread of disease.  See Louisiana v. Mathews, 427 F.Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. La. 1977).  
Notably, in so doing, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana explicitly stated that 
“[i]t has long been established that businesses which affect interstate commerce may have their 
intrastate activities regulated.”  Id.  Thus, to the extent the regulation of intrastate commerce in 
DRT is necessary to prevent negative outcomes in interstate commerce, it is likely that the FDA 
could establish authority to regulate such intrastate commerce.  Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate the production of wheat going into 
interstate commerce extends to wheat intended for personal use and not placed in interstate 
commerce.). 
304 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“[T]he regulation of medicine . . . [has] historically been 
dealt with under state law, not federal law.”); Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 15 
(mentioning FDA’s policy of not regulating the practice of medicine).   
305 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006) (internal citations omitted) (“Even though 
regulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern . . . there is 
no question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in these areas.”).  
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genetic aspects of DRT would touch upon the practice of medicine as some have 
argued,306 such regulation would be permissible307 and, at any rate, would not constitute a 
regulation of the practice of medicine any more than the well-accepted safety 
requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.308    
Moreover, FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT requiring the screening 
and testing of potential donors for genetic diseases would not directly impact the practice 
of medicine but would merely set the minimum safety standards for DRT intended for a 
later use by physicians.  For example, it would not influence the interaction between 
physicians and their patients.  Rather, the regulation would influence directly only the 
interaction between DRT institutions and practitioners with potential donors, and, only 
later on, affect DRT recipients.  Admittedly, it is likely that some of the employees of 
DRT institutions are physicians and that in small institutions it might be the same 
physician who would harvest the DRT and then dispense it to patients.  Yet, this fact does 
not automatically make the relationship between such physicians and donors a physician-
patient relationship.309  Finally, to the extent that FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of 
DRT may impinge upon state regulation of the practice of medicine, it would do so no 
more than the FDA’s existing regulation of the communicable diseases aspects of 
DRT.310 
                                                
306 When the FDA was just making its first steps into the regulation of DRT, professional 
organizations argued that it was “wading into the practice of medicine.”  See FDA Tissue 
Practices Rule is Criticized by Industry, Physicians, FDA Week, June 1, 2001, at 14.  Yet, even 
those who criticized the FDA’s intentions to regulate some of the transactions taking place 
between physicians and their patients agreed that regulation “at the sperm bank level” is justified 
and even desirable.  Id.  
307 Notably, an issue remains with respect to potential preemption of state laws by FDA 
regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT.  However, this issue exceeds the scope of this Article.  
308 Cf. Merrill, supra note 23, at 79 (“FDA has assumed oversight of other novel medical 
technologies and the common feature—use in the delivery of medical care—may lead to an 
assumption [that] Congress expects the agency to assume responsibility.”). 
309 See Annas, supra note 22, at 938 (“[T]o the extent that [ART] has become big business and 
to the extent that it is more accurately characterized as a commercial enterprise than as a medical 
or family-related enterprise, federal regulation of at least its interstate commercial aspects 
deserves consideration.”).  
310 A requirement in federal regulation to screen and test donors for genetic diseases would not 
represent more interference in the practice of medicine or in the standards of practice upheld by 
the states than the similar federal requirements that are already in place with respect to 
communicable diseases.  Furthermore, as stated by a former FDA official in the context of 
communicable diseases: “when one considers the obvious need to screen and test donors for 
communicable disease, [it makes] the practice of medicine issue less prominent.”  Human Tissues 
and Organs, supra note 104, at 11 (presentation of Stuart Nightingale, Associate Comm’r for 
Health Affairs, FDA).  A similar argument could be made with respect to the screening and 
testing for genetic diseases. 
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
   299 
3. The Difficulty in Defining “Genetic Diseases”   
A conceptual difficulty that seems to haunt the discussion of genetic diseases is 
how to define the term “genetic disease.”  This difficulty is twofold:  in order to define 
“genetic disease” one must first define “disease”—an elusive concept which baffles 
healthcare professionals and policymakers.  Second, one must generally characterize the 
phenotypes that fall within the boundaries of the concept of “disease.”  The genetic 
context only complicates things further since many genetic traits cannot be characterized 
merely as either present or not-present but rather manifest themselves in many variations.  
For example, at what point (if at all) does one’s stature become debilitating enough to be 
considered a “disease?”  And are conditions such as dwarfism and genetic deafness 
“genetic diseases” that justify exclusion of those having them from the DRT donor 
pool?311  
These conceptual difficulties could pose a real obstacle to a regulation of the 
genetic aspects of DRT.312  Yet, regardless of whether the difficulties in defining “genetic 
diseases” played a role in the FDA’s decision not to regulate the genetic aspects of DRT, 
such difficulties should not serve as a justification for not pursuing regulation of this area.  
One does not have to be in possession of a clear and coherent definition of genetic 
diseases to determine that conditions such as Huntington’s disease and ADPKD are 
genetic diseases that should be screened out of any donor pool.  As for those genetic 
conditions in which a decision is not as easy, the FDA could elect to rely on the judgment 
of professional organizations, expert bodies and the like to determine whether they 
warrant exclusion from the donor pool in promulgating its regulations.313  
4. Bioethical Issues 
Another possible reason for the FDA’s avoidance of the genetic aspects of DRT is 
that regulation of this area would inevitably raise a variety of ethical issues.314  As 
                                                
311 See Robertson, supra note 222, at 441 (“Persons with disabilities are concerned about 
biases in genetic screening [and testing] programs that disfavor persons with disabilities.”); see 
also Martha A. Field, Killing “the Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 Harv. Women’s 
L.J. 79 (1993); Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal 
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, 29(5) Hastings Center Report at S1 (1999) (laying 
out the disabled-rights criticism of genetic screening and testing). 
312 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 10, at 301-02.  
313 See infra note 336 (discussing the privatization of regulation).  Notably, reliance on bodies 
of experts has been a widely used method for tackling complicated public policy issues.  See, e.g., 
The Presidential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, http://www.bioethics.gov (last 
visited Jun. 17, 2010).  A possible advantage of such expert bodies is that they serve as a “black 
box”—a socially acceptable decision-making method which is especially suited for issues that 
spur social controversy. 
314 Such issues may include the following:  which genetic diseases (if any) should render a 
candidate ineligible to become a donor?  How much choice should potential parents have in 
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recognized by several scholars, executive agencies are known to be averse to regulating 
matters that raise bioethical issues, especially in the context of ART, and therefore tend to 
refrain from regulating such matters to the extent possible.315  Others have suggested that 
the FDA might be trying to avoid the regulation of DRT because it wishes to prevent a 
hijacking of the regulatory process by interest groups wishing to promote their ethical 
preferences.316  Thus, it is conceivable that in avoiding the regulation of genetic aspects 
of DRT the FDA might have actually been trying to avoid the bioethical issues involved, 
thereby passing this hot potato along to others, e.g., professional organizations, state 
courts and expert commissions.   
If this is indeed the case, the FDA might be throwing the baby out with the bath 
water because in so doing it foregoes an opportunity to regulate aspects of this area that 
do not raise difficult ethical issues.317  Moreover, as discussed earlier with relation to the 
European model of regulation of DRT, it is possible to maintain the safety of DRT 
children without compromising ethics by deferring to and adopting into its regulation 
“ready-made” practical and ethical solutions devised by other authoritative institutions 
                                                                                                                                            
choosing the traits of their offspring?  Who should have access to a candidate’s genetic data or to 
that of her family members which she has unavoidably disclosed as part of the screening and 
testing process?  See Robertson, supra note 222, at 457-459 (addressing the impact of screening 
and testing on offspring and arguing that screening and testing are a “private” form of eugenics 
that is permissible); Terra Ziporyn, ‘Artificial’ Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social 
Concerns, 255 JAMA 13, 14 (1986) (describing issues related to donors’ privacy).     
315 According to the President’s Council on Bioethics, “[t]he appeal of doing nothing in [the 
area of ART] is, frankly, rather great, not only because the costs of regulation may be high . . . but 
also because the areas of assisted reproduction, new genomic knowledge, and embryo research 
are socially and politically quite sensitive.”  Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 185; 
see also Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness 48-49 (1982) (arguing that “[r]egulatory officials . . . often are grateful for the 
opportunity to escape responsibility for the intellectually difficult and politically touchy task of 
making [risk vs. social benefit] trade-off decisions” and quoting former FDA commissioner, 
Donald Kennedy statement that “[f]ortunately, our statute does not allow us to weigh adverse 
health conditions against dollars”); Annas, supra note 22, at 937 (arguing that the United States 
has been slow to regulate the ART industry because of bioethical controversies); Judith Daar, 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 609, 639 
(1997) (suggesting that the lack of regulation of ART is a result, at least in part, of the fact that 
this area is politically charged).  
316 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 63 n.332 (“It is possible, perhaps even likely, that FDA was 
reluctant to acknowledge its authority to regulate a set of procedures that have excited intense 
interest, considerable controversy, and wide publicity . . . if the Agency were to enter the [area of 
assisted reproductive services], it would surely face pressure from opponents of many of these 
services to go much further than ‘mere’ public health concerns might lead it to go.”).  
317 For example, the merits of requiring the screening and testing of potential donors for 
ADPKD, Tay-Sachs and other lethal genetic conditions is not controversial. 
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such as professional organizations.318  Thus, hypothetically, if the FDA were to regulate 
the genetic aspects of DRT it could use practice guidelines and professional standards for 
determining which conditions should be screened and tested for.  In this way, the FDA 
could remain within its element—the safety of DRT recipients and DRT children—and 
avoid the need to address specific bioethical issues while deferring to and benefiting from 
thoughtful solutions devised by professionals, which usually reflect careful balances 
struck through a significant investment of resources and expertise.   
5. Cost Considerations 
Arguably, regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT would impose such costly 
requirements that it might make DRT more, and possibly even prohibitively, expensive 
for some potential DRT recipients.319  This might not only cause many DRT institutions 
to go out of business320 but also may encourage many potential consumers who would no 
longer be able to afford to pay for DRT to seek other, less strictly regulated sources of 
DRT (e.g., abroad) or even forego the option of using DRT altogether.   
Although there is no current estimate of the costs of applying the genetic 
screening and testing schemes recommended by the ASRM and AATB, it is possible to 
estimate the cost of such screening and testing.  First, all of the states fund programs for 
the genetic testing of newborns for various genetic conditions that, with proper care, 
could be treated if diagnosed at an early stage.321  New York State, for example, runs a 
Newborn Screening Program that performs over eleven million tests annually and tests 
                                                
318 Choosing this course of action may give rise to constitutional issues having to do with the 
delegation of FDA power to private entities.  See infra note 336.  
319 Requiring the routine testing of every potential DRT donor for various conditions could 
result in a considerable increase in the costs involved in the processing of DRT.  
320 The most costly elements of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT would probably be 
the heightened screening and testing requirements.  There are a few other possible costs involved 
in such regulation, e.g., costs involved in inspection and complying with inspection requirements, 
costs involved in appropriate recordkeeping, costs of communicating adverse events, etc.  Yet, it 
appears that such costs would be very low, if not nominal.  For example, the FDA estimated the 
costs related to being subject to periodic inspections at approximately $768 per establishment per 
inspection.  See 69 Fed. Reg. 68663 (FDA Nov. 24, 2004).    
321 See Nat’l Newborn Screening & Genetic Resource Ctr., State Map Page, http://genes-r-
us.uthscsa.edu/resources/consumer/statemap.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  For a list of genetic 
conditions for which newborns are tested, see the National Newborn Screening Status Report 
(July 7, 2009), available at http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/nbsdisorders.pdf.  The existence of such 
genetic testing programs funded by all of the states also seems to reinforce the arguments in favor 
of genetic testing of DRT donors.  Specifically, if it is justifiable to conduct genetic testing after a 
child is born, then it is even more justified to screen beforehand, i.e. prior to the actual 
manifestation of the genetic risk which arguably occurs at the moment of conception.  In other 
words, genetic testing of DRT donors is a true preventative measure while newborn screening 
could at best guarantee appropriate treatment of an existing and irreversible genetic condition. 
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over a quarter of a million newborns a year for more than forty genetic conditions as well 
as HIV and congenital hypothyroidism.322  The annual cost of all of the testing done by 
the New York Program is $11.9 million.323  Second, numerous private laboratories offer 
various genetic testing products and services:  for as little as $25, parents and physicians 
may acquire kits or sets of genetic tests.324  For instance, the University of Colorado 
offers a kit that tests for twenty disorders recommended by the American College of 
Medical Genetics (ACMG) for $25;325 another private laboratory offers testing for about 
fifty genetic conditions for $199.326  Third, some laboratories also offer prenatal genetic 
screening.  For example, for a price of $1,850, one private laboratory offers genetic 
testing of fetuses based on DNA chip technology that evaluates over 2,100 DNA 
sequences associated with over 100 genetic syndromes.327  These figures suggest that the 
average cost of genetic testing for a given genetic mutation could be estimated at about 
$1-3, depending on the technology used.  Thus, under a rough estimate, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the genetic testing of potential DRT donors in accordance 
with professional guidelines would cost several hundreds of dollars per donor.328   
                                                
322 See Wadsworth Center Newborn Screening Program, 
http://www.wadsworth.org/newborn/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
323 Electronic mail letter from Deborah Rodriguez, Newborn Information Coordinator, 
Wadsworth Center, to author (July 21, 2009) (on file with author).  Based on these figures it is 
possible to roughly calculate the cost of testing at about $47.6 per newborn and $1.08 per test.  
324 See, e.g., Save Babies Through Screening Foundation, A Parent’s Guide to Newborn 
Screening 2 (May 2005), available at 
http://www.savebabies.org/library/HandoutAParentsGuidetoNBS.pdf.     
325 See Univ. of Colorado Health Sciences Ctr., Expanded Newborn Screening Program, 
http://www.uchsc.edu/newbornscreening/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  
326 See PerkinElmer Genetics, Order StepOne®, 
http://www.perkinelmergenetics.com/OrderScreeningPacket.htm (last visited May 9, 2010).  For 
a list of the genetic conditions tested for, see 
http://www.perkinelmergenetics.com/DisordersScreened.htm (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).  
327 See The President’s Council on Bioethics, The Changing Moral Focus of Newborn 
Screening 80 (2008) [hereinafter Changing Moral Focus] available at 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/newborn_screening/index.html.  See also Signature 
Genomic Laboratories, Signature PrenatalChip®, 
http://www.signaturegenomics.com/prenatalchip.html (last visited May 9, 2010).   
328 This estimate is based on the assumption that professional guidelines would require testing 
for a few hundred known genetic mutations and that the cost of testing for each individual 
mutation is, as mentioned above $1-3.  It is probably also safe to assume that, in the future, as 
testing technologies advance and become more commonplace, genetic testing of DRT donors 
would become cheaper.  It is anticipated that by 2014, the sequencing of an entire human genome 
would cost only about $1,000.  See Changing Moral Focus, supra note 327, at 52.  Analysis of an 
entire individual’s genome would make it possible to analyze the genome of such individual for 
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It is important to note that not all potential DRT donors should be subject to such 
extensive testing; only the most promising candidates who make it through vigorous 
initial screening based on a physical examination and thorough questioning would merit 
such expenditure.  Thus, even if we assume that such extensive genetic testing of 
potential DRT donors would impose additional costs on DRT institutions and—by way of 
roll over—recipients, it is expected that such additional costs and expenditure would not 
make DRT significantly more costly or less accessible than it already is.329 
Moreover, if one is to accept the picture of institutional compliance with 
professional guidelines among DRT institutions portrayed by the FDA, it may well be 
that regulating the genetic aspects of DRT would not substantially affect the DRT 
industry.  According to the FDA, the twenty largest DRT institutions that account for 
95% of the DRT industry already screen and test potential DRT donors in accordance 
with professional guidelines.330  Thus, presumably, regulations requiring compliance with 
professional standards as they pertain to genetic aspects of DRT would not impose 
additional costs on most DRT transactions.  Rather, such regulations would only affect 
DRT institutions that do not already follow professional guidelines and recipients 
purchasing DRT from such institutions.331 
Another aspect of the costs involved in regulating the genetic aspects of DRT is 
the costs that such regulation would impose on the FDA itself.  Agencies’ ability and 
willingness to regulate are closely linked to the financial burden that the regulation would 
impose on their limited resources. Yet, the cost of regulation to agencies often tends to be 
                                                                                                                                            
all the genetic mutations known without having to resort to costly and cumbersome specific 
testing for specific genetic conditions, as is done now.  
329 With each sperm sample sold at a few hundreds of dollars and under the assumption that 
each sperm donor would be the source of at least dozens of samples, it may be assumed that the 
additional cost of extensive genetic testing would not significantly contribute to the cost of sperm.  
The cost of egg donations, on the other hand, is already so high, that arguably, the additional cost 
of proper genetic testing of potential donors is not expected to change it significantly.  
Notably, the area of DRT raises numerous issues related to the accessibility of DRT and 
related services to different income groups.  DRT in general and egg donations in particular are 
expensive propositions and, as such, are more available to individuals and families with higher 
income and/or better medical insurance coverage that includes DRT and related services.  Yet, 
given the above conclusion that proper genetic screening and testing of DRT is not expected to 
make DRT and related services significantly more expensive, it is also not expected that it would 
push DRT and related services further beyond the reach of lower income groups. 
330 According to the FDA, those institutions that were in compliance with AATB standards 
would have felt minimal impact as a result of the FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, while the 
remaining 90 smaller institutions examined, which accounted for 5% of the industry, “[would] be 
more significantly affected.”  See FDA Final Donor Eligibility Rule, supra note 24, at 29819.   
331 Regulatory requirement of genetic screening and testing that conforms to professional 
guidelines would therefore prevent a possible market failure where such non-compliant DRT 
institutions externalize the costs involved in appropriate screening and testing to DRT recipients 
and DRT children in the form of heightened risk.   
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overlooked.332   However, given that the FDA is already involved in the regulation of 
DRT and inspection of DRT institutions, applying the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations’ 
framework to genetic aspects of DRT should not create a substantial additional financial 
burden for the FDA.333  
Finally, in performing the cost-benefit analysis in the context of genetic screening 
and testing of DRT, it is imperative to consider the possible long-term benefits that 
mandatory testing requirements may have on future healthcare expenditure on a societal 
scale.    
In conclusion, the regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT is likely to raise 
conceptual and bioethical issues and impose at least some additional costs on DRT 
institutions and recipients.  Yet, these obstacles are not unique to this area of regulation 
and should not deter the FDA.  Furthermore, as demonstrated above, FDA regulation of 
the area of genetic aspects of DRT could rely on solid legislative and constitutional 
grounds.  Accordingly, such regulation is not only desirable but also feasible.   
 
C. Some Recommendations for FDA Regulation of the Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue 
As mentioned earlier, this article does not purport to suggest exactly what FDA 
regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT should look like and what it should include; 
these issues are best left to the expertise of the FDA and DRT professionals.  However, it 
is possible to enumerate key elements that such regulation should include.  
Perhaps the most important purpose of regulation of the genetic aspects of DRT 
should be ensuring the health and safety of DRT children rather than just those of DRT 
recipients and donors.334  Just as in the context of communicable diseases, the regulation 
should be based on an understanding that the mere fact that a disease might occur in the 
general population—which does not have its reproductive cells and tissues screened and 
                                                
332 It is not unfathomable that one of the reasons that the FDA has not regulated the genetic 
aspects of DRT is simply a lack of resources.  For example, according to an FDA official, lack of 
manpower and resources to regulate sperm banks was the underlying reason for allowing self-
regulation in the area of DRT.  See Human Tissues and Organs, supra note 104, at 23-24 
(“[S]ince basically the entire scientific staff and other personnel devoted to sperm banking was 
myself about half-time, and because the American Association of Tissue Banks had been formed 
at the same time, we decided that we would maintain a liaison with AATB and allow voluntary 
standards to be used in the area of semen banking.”).  According to Merrill, the FDA appears to 
“confront more than its share of novel challenges” and thus may have to decide how to distribute 
its limited resources more frequently than other agencies.  See Merrill, supra note 23, at 2.  
333 See Merrill, supra note 23, at 80 (characterizing the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations as 
striking “a reasonable balance between public health protection, on the one hand, and the 
constraints of its own budget and tissue bank resources on the other”). 
334 See Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 217.   
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tested—does not justify not taking measures to avoid it in DRT children.335  Thus, in 
regulating the genetic aspects of DRT, the FDA should strive to ensure that DRT 
institutions take all reasonable measures to prevent and avoid the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in DRT children. 
In promulgating regulations addressing the genetic aspects of DRT, especially in 
the context of screening and testing requirements, the FDA should consider the 
recommendations and guidelines of professional organizations.336  As explained above, 
the FDA could greatly benefit from the accumulated knowledge, experience and thinking 
in professional organizations and from solutions they have come up with through years of 
dealing with the issues that are going to become the focus of regulation.  By relying on 
professional standards, the FDA would not only ensure that its regulatory scheme is 
always reasonably up-to-date and relevant but also preserve the financial and political 
                                                
335 See Ziporyn, supra note 314, at 14 (quoting Lori Andrews’ argument that the position that 
there is no need to test DRT donors for medical and genetic defects because “normal” couples do 
not always undergo genetic testing before conception is “unscientific and unethical”); see also 
supra Part II.E.    
336 See Council on Bioethics Report, supra note 100, at 217 (recognizing that professional 
oversight has traditionally been the principal mechanism of regulation for the practice of 
medicine).  Notably, coordination with the recommendations and guidelines of professional 
organizations coincides with the FDA’s own preferences with relation to the regulation of human 
tissue.  See Zoon Statement, supra note 59, at 105 (“In the future . . . FDA intends to use various 
venues to continue our dialogue with industry organizations such as the AATB . . . [and] the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)/Society or [sic] Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART).”).  
Importantly, deferment to and reliance on standards set by professional organizations raises 
the issue of “privatization as delegation.”  See generally Gillian Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 Col. L. Rev. 1367 (2003).  According to Metzger, when private entities “wield 
substantial power over government programs and their participants,” the government effectively 
delegates power to such private entities in a manner that might undermine “constitutional 
accountability.”  Id. at 1376-77.  Metzger argues that for such delegation of government power to 
private entities to be constitutional it must be sufficiently constrained, e.g., by ensuring 
government supervision over the private entities’ decision-making by creating a complaint or 
appeal system through which affected third-parties could challenge specific decisions, policies 
and procedures of the private entities that affect them.  Id. at 1471-72.  Arguably, per Metzger, 
FDA reliance on and deferment to professional guidelines (such as those of the AATB and 
ASRM) in the context of regulation of genetic aspects of DRT could constitute a delegation of 
government power to private entities because it may effectively enable such entities to act on 
behalf of the government in formulating professional standards of practice for third parties, i.e. 
DRT institutions.  Id. at 1462.  Accordingly, in order to ensure that such reliance on professional 
guidelines is endowed with sufficient constitutional accountability, the FDA could include in the 
regulations addressing the genetic aspects of DRT a mechanism that would enable DRT 
institutions affected by professional guidelines to challenge the inclusion of a particular guideline 
or standard in the regulations.  Notably, such a mechanism, the Tissue Reference Group (TRG) 
has already been established in the Human Tissue Regulations to resolve disputes arising from 
implementation of these regulations.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 5451 (FDA Jan. 19, 2001) (comment 7).  
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resources that it would otherwise need to expend on tackling complicated bioethical 
issues.337   
As for the screening and testing of potential donors, the FDA could rely on a 
protocol similar to the one it already employs in its Human Tissue Regulations, which 
requires, among other things, the collection of relevant medical records, including a 
donor’s medical history and physical examination report.338  The FDA should also 
require the collection of as detailed a family medical history as possible and its use to 
identify risk factors that may prompt further specific testing beyond that which would be 
required from every donor or from donors belonging to particular ethnic groups.339   
The FDA regulations should set up a national record-keeping system that includes 
information on all donors nationwide.  The database should assist in keeping track of the 
number of DRT children born from each donor’s gametes and include the medical history 
of donors, their contact information and adverse events in DRT children as they pertain to 
genetic conditions.  Such a database could assist in avoiding procreation between blood-
related DRT children.340  Even more importantly, it would ensure that DRT suspected of 
causing adverse effects is not used again and that the donor is not permitted to donate any 
more DRT anywhere in the country before the source of the genetic problem is 
verified.341    
Finally, as recommended by the GAO, the FDA regulations should require that 
prospective DRT recipients be made aware and receive an explanation of relevant genetic 
                                                
337 See supra Part IV.B.4.   
338 See FDA’s Guidance for Industry Announcement, supra note 50, at 12-14.   
339 Identifying risk factors and assessing them are also required by the FDA with respect to 
communicable diseases.  See id. at 15.   
340 See Cohen, supra note 23, at 363.  
341 Such a database would have helped in preventing cases such as that of the Michigan donor 
whose sperm was used for conceiving 11 children, five of whom were later found to have an 
extremely rare type of leukemia.  See Denise Grady, Sperm Donor Seen as Source of Disease in 5 
Children, N.Y. Times May 19, 2006, at A16.  According to experts, this particular genetic defect, 
which is passed along by an autosomal dominant gene, would probably not have been picked up 
as part of a regular screening and testing protocol.  Id.  However, a database would have enabled 
reporting of the discovery of the first case of leukemia in the donor’s progeny, thereby not only 
alerting other recipients (through their DRT institutions) regarding possible risks to their DRT 
children, but also ensuring that DRT institutions did not further use the compromised donor’s 
DRT.  Cf. Daar & Brzyski, supra note 15, at 1703 (calling for the institution of a national gamete 
donor registry to avoid such cases as the recently reported transmission of potentially lethal heart 
defect by a sperm donor to 9 out of 24 children conceived using his sperm, including the donor’s 
own child); Maron et al., supra note 5, at 1681-83 (reporting a case where a donor transmitted a 
unique genetic condition causing a lethal heart defect to at least 9 out of 24 children conceived 
from his sperm, including one of his own two sons, recommending assembling and sharing 
clinical data for all individuals born from the same donor’s DRT and emphasizing the importance 
of notifying gamete donors, recipients, and other affected parties about the occurrence of genetic 
diseases).   
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data of potential donors in accordance with existing informed consent standards.  DRT 
recipients should also be advised about the types of genetic testing, if any, performed on 
any particular DRT and the potential risks of genetic diseases embodied in that particular 
DRT as compared to the level of risk in the general population.342  In this manner, the 
FDA regulations would not only ensure that DRT recipients only use genetically 
compromised DRT after making an informed choice but also that they are made aware of 
the possible monetary and legal ramifications of such a choice.343   
V. CONCLUSION 
Three decades have passed since Curie-Cohen published the results of a survey 
revealing significant deficiencies in the practices of genetic screening and testing of 
sperm and yet, children born from donated reproductive tissue, whether sperm or ova, are 
still exposed to unnecessarily high levels of genetic risk.  Despite ongoing efforts by 
professional organizations, the extent of self-regulation of the donated reproductive tissue 
industry is unclear and its effectiveness is questionable.  Accompanied by inconsistent 
state regulation of the reproductive tissue industry and non-deterring relief afforded by 
                                                
342 Enforcing such a requirement would put DRT recipients in the place of other couples who 
undergo prenatal medical screening and testing for genetic diseases prevalent in their ethnic 
group and would enable them to make their own decision whether they wish to use the DRT at 
the risk of passing an identified genetic condition to their DRT child, forego the use of the 
particular DRT or utilize pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to test their embryo.  See 
Robertson, supra note 222, at 456-57 (describing the different possible choices prospective 
parents have);  see also GAO 1997 Report, supra note 182, at 31 (“We recommend that the 
Secretary . . . direct FDA to take action in several areas to improve the safety of [DRT] and to 
increase FDA’s ability to regulate tissue facility activities . . . FDA should also add to its 
oversight plans provisions that would require . . . disclosure of genetic tests that have been 
performed on donated reproductive tissue.”).  Interestingly, in its response to the GAO 1997 
Report, the FDA agreed with these requirements.  See Letter from Diane E. Thompson, Associate 
Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, DHHS, to Bernice Steinhardt, Director, HEHS, GAO (Oct. 
23, 1997) (“In general, FDA agrees that recipients of tissue should know, through appropriate 
labeling of the tissue, the results of testing performed.  Ethical, scientific and regulatory issues 
regarding genetic tests are currently under discussion within the Department of Health and 
Human Services in connection with the final report of the Task Force on Genetic Testing.”).  
Notably, the report of the Task Force on Genetic Testing mentioned in the FDA’s response does 
not mention the genetic screening or testing of DRT.  See Final Report of the Task Force on 
Genetic Testing (Neil A. Holtzman and Michael S. Watson eds. 1997), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/10001733. 
343 Some of the ramifications of choosing to use genetically-compromised DRT could include, 
for example, an implied waiver of possible claims against professionals involved in the 
preparation, distribution and use of the DRT.  Requiring disclosure and informed consent with 
respect to genetic conditions that might be passed along by particular DRT would also provide 
adequate response to any concerns regarding the reproductive freedom of recipients.  See 
Robertson, supra note 222, at 457 (“[W]anting information about the genetic makeup of 
prospective offspring and then acting on it fits squarely within conventional understandings of 
procreative liberty.”).   
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the courts in matters involving children born from genetically defective donated 
reproductive tissue, the genetic safety of individuals born from such tissue is a cause for 
concern.  
This Article described only a handful of publicized tragedies that befell children 
born from genetically defective reproductive tissue and their families.  There is no way of 
knowing how many more such cases actually occurred, and yet, without a fundamental 
change in the regulation of donated reproductive tissue to address genetic risks involved 
in the use of such tissue, more tragedies are very likely to occur.  As we accumulate 
knowledge about human genetics and develop more diagnostic means to test for and 
possibly prevent the transmission of genetic diseases through donated reproductive tissue, 
the need for regulation will only become more accentuated.  Furthermore, without 
appropriate regulation, the growing demand for donated reproductive tissue will further 
increase the genetic risks involved in the use of donated reproductive tissue.  
As recognized by the FDA, non-involvement of the federal government in the 
area of donated reproductive tissue jeopardizes the safety of the public.  Thus, at least as 
a matter of public health policy, the FDA’s distinction between communicable diseases 
and genetic diseases in the context of donated reproductive tissue cannot be justified.  
The Public Health Service Act endows the FDA with ample authority to regulate all 
aspects of donated reproductive tissue and provides it with all the tools necessary to 
ensure the safety of recipients of such tissue and their children.  Indeed, the regulation of 
genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue would undoubtedly raise difficulties 
resulting, for example, from bioethical issues involved in this area and the need to 
carefully balance costs against potential benefits.  However, overcoming such difficulties 
is well within the capabilities of the FDA.     
Furthermore, regulations addressing the genetic risks involved in the use of 
donated reproductive tissue could offer “a unique opportunity to reduce or even eliminate 
genetic risks,”344 which would benefit generations to come.  Unfortunately, it appears that 
the regulation of genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue is not on the FDA’s “to 
do list.”345  Hopefully, renewed interest in the regulation of sectors that are not 
sufficiently self-regulated will prompt the FDA to supplement its current regulation so as 
to also address the genetic aspects of donated reproductive tissue.  
                                                
344 See Conrad, supra note 10, at 298.  
345 In its June 2007 report, the FDA’s Human Tissue Task Force listed numerous 
“recommendations that may be implemented with additional planning and/or resources,” which 
would improve the breadth and depth of the FDA’s Human Tissue Regulations.  However, these 
recommendations did not include addressing genetic aspects of DRT.  See HTTF Report, supra 
note 67, at 7.   
